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A fundamental part of human experience is self-continuity, or the sense of me extended 
across time, yet these processes that give rise to this temporal extension have remained 
largely understudied in the work psychology literature. Self-defining memories provide 
one mechanism for beginning to understand the role of an individual’s unique past on their 
present moment, and when shared with others they provide a vivid and succinct snapshot 
to convey a part of the individual’s extended self. In this paper, I outline the memory 
sharing process from the sharer to the listener. In Study 1, workers were asked to recall a 
self-defining or everyday memory to explore the associated phenomenological memory 
characteristics and the language used to describe and share that memory. In Study 2, 
workers were asked to read memory vignettes provided in Study 1 to explore how the 
information contained in the shared memories are used by the memory listener to inform 
affective (e.g., likability, affective trust, and empathy) and informational (e.g., 
meaningfulness, insight, and cognitive trust) outcomes. Results indicate that self-defining 
memories, compared to everyday memories, are shared using self-focused and causal 
language that reflects achievement and power drives. When shared with the memory 
listener, self-defining memories are perceived as more affectively intense and central to the 
sharer’s sense of self, suggesting that the language used to share the memory can 
communicate phenomenological information to the listener. Finally, the listener’s 
perception of the shared memory is related to affective and informational outcomes. 
Specifically, perceived self-centrality was positively related to likability, affective trust, 
empathy, work meaningfulness, and insight. By studying the memory sharing process of 
 x
self-defining work memories, we can begin to understand how the sharing of the 






CHAPTER 1. THE SOCIAL USES OF SELF-DEFINING 
MEMORIES AT WORK 
A fundamental aspect of the sense of self is a sense of self-continuity, or a sense of 
me over time. Indeed, this may be the most fundamental aspect of the sense of self, yet it 
has received comparatively little research when compared to other aspects of the 
experience of self, such as regulation, efficacy, self-evaluations, or identity (see Chang, 
Ferris, Johnson, Rosen, & Tan, 2012; Lord, Diefendorff, Schmidt, & Hall, 2010; Ashforth 
& Schinoff, 2016). These orientations have focused on the self as an object to be evaluated 
and have largely ignored the mental processes that give rise to feelings of unity and 
coherence over time (Prebble, Addis, & Tippett, 2013). 
 Certainly, the study of work experiences over time has received much attention. 
However, we should make a clear distinction between research paradigms that study the 
person moving through time compared to orientations of the person embedded in time (see 
Figure 1). While the problem of time has become increasingly incorporated into our 
understanding of the person at work, theoretical and empirical work has been limited to the 
person moving through time (see Figure 1). Models are increasingly moving from assessing 
individuals at a single moment to longitudinal models that investigate people changing over 
years, months, days, or even minutes. However, these models have stopped short of looking 
at the individual embedded in time (see Figure 2). We experientially know that life is not 
experienced as a series of disjointed moments. Instead, our personal past and aspirations 
for the future constitute our present and give meaning to the challenges and opportunities 
we face. By beginning to understand the person embedded in time and the processes that 
give rise to self-continuity, we can begin to study how a person’s unique past and 
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experiences are brought to bear on affective, behavioral, and cognitive processes in the 















Figure 1 - Depiction of a person moving through time in traditional IO/OB measures. 
The person is assessed at multiple time points and is presumed to change across time.
Time 
Figure 2 - Depiction of a person embedded in time as proposed by the current paper 
on phenomenological and semantic continuity. Individuals’ present experiences are 
grounded by their personal past and future aspirations. 
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 Episodic memories are a critical component for establishing this phenomenological 
continuity, or the subjective feeling of “mineness” of experiences through time (Zahavi, 
2005). These memories are recollectively experienced, meaning that the remembering is 
accompanied by sensory-perceptual and affective detail that allows the past to be re-
experienced in the present moment (Conway, 2009). This recollective or autonoetic 
remembering (Tulving, 1985, 2002) contributes to the feeling of “mineness” that tags a 
memory as a personally experienced memory. For example, I know information about 
myself (e.g., my birthdate) and about my coworkers (e.g., she went camping in the 
mountains last weekend), but this information is not tagged with the phenomenal sense of 
“mineness” that connects it to my personal experience. However, I remember sitting by the 
fire at Red Top Mountain State Park while camping with my friends. This feeling of 
“mineness” of experience is a fundamental component of phenomenological continuity that 
allows the individual to “perceive the present moment as both a continuation of their past 
and as a prelude to their future” (Wheeler, Stuss, & Tulving, 1997, p. 335). Neuroimaging 
and aging research supports this claim, finding that the autonoetic and imagery component 
of episodic memory allows individuals to connect past experience to the present and project 
themselves forward into an imagined future (Addis, Pan, Vu, Laiser, & Schacter, 2009; 
Addis, Sacchetti, Ally, Budson, & Schacter, 2009; Addis & Tippett, 2008; Addis, Wong, 
& Schacter, 2007). Thus, studying an individual’s episodic memories provides an 
opportunity to begin to understand the mechanisms that lead to self-continuity, or the 
person embedded in time.  
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 Under the umbrella of episodic memories, self-defining memories provide vivid 
recollections of personally meaningful past events. Specifically, self-defining memories 
are a subset of episodic memories characterized by “affective intensity, vividness, high 
levels of rehearsal, linkage to similar memories, and connection to an enduring concern or 
unresolved conflict” (Conway, Singer, & Tagini, 2004, p. 504; Singer & Salovey, 1993). 
These vivid, emotional memories are experience-near records of past events, or records 
characterized by great detail and mental “reliving” of the event, and are also strongly 
connected to individuals’ long-term goals and sense of self. It is this connection to long-
term goals that differentiates self-defining memories from other common, everyday 
memories. In preparation for this study, a brief pilot was conducted to explore the ability 
of individuals to report self-defining memories about their work. From this pilot, a 
participant reported the following self-defining memory describing her first promotion:  
I recall this day very well. I was called into my boss's office unexpectedly. At first, 
I thought that there may be a problem, that I made an error or that there would be a 
layoff. When my boss began to explain the reason for the unexpected meeting, I 
couldn't stop smiling almost giggly as I learned that I was being promoted. I came 
from an extremely underprivileged background…. I wanted a better life for myself 
so I really had to learn a lot about self-discipline and dedication. I knew in the long 
run that it would pay off but there were many times that I felt like I couldn't go on. 
During times that I really felt overwhelmed I would fall behind on my class work, 
then force myself to get caught up again. No matter how troubled I was, I was 
determined to change my life and make a difference for myself and my family. I 
took a long time and sometimes it felt like it would never end. Even after I 
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graduated and had my college degree I felt the same, like nothing really changed. I 
got a new job and that was nice but didn't make me feel like I had made it. I 
continued to learn and take classes in my field while working at my new job, in my 
mind to make it I had to be the best. I thought that once I felt like I was the best 
then I would be deserving, then I could demand better wages and benefits. I never 
expected that my boss would see how hard I was trying because no one really had 
before. I was completely shocked by the promotion and more importantly that my 
boss and company felt that I was qualified and could perform the duties of the new 
position. Twenty-one years ago, I started on my path and at thirty-three years old I 
finally made it. I will never forget that day and how much it meant to me. 
This memory is a vivid and emotional memory of her first promotion. She “recalls 
this day very well” and remembers being “called into [her] boss’s office unexpectedly.” 
During this meeting, her anxiety turned to excitement and she “couldn’t stop smiling” and 
became “almost giggly” upon learning about her promotion. Perhaps most importantly, this 
memory is connected to her sense of self and her struggle to “make it” professionally and 
financially. Coming from an underprivileged background, she worked and sacrificed for 
years, and this promotion felt like the successful culmination of those efforts. She was 
“completely shocked by the promotion and… that [her] boss and company felt [she] was 
qualified.” This promotion represents the moment that she “finally made it,” and she will 
“never forget that day and how much it meant to [her].” This vivid memory serves as an 
enduring connection between the individual’s past and present, constructing a sense of 
continuity across time.  
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 In addition to constructing phenomenological continuity, self-defining memories 
also provide a quick snapshot of personal experience that is easily shared with others. They 
are self-contained episodes of a single event that connect to the individual’s long-term 
goals or aspirations. Thus, these memories can provide an easy and constrained way to 
share “who I am” with others.  
 In an ideal world, our memories could be recalled and communicated to others with 
perfect clarity, as with the magical Pensieve in J.K. Rowling’s fictional novels (Rowling, 
2000, 2003, 2005, 2007). The Pensieve is a magical device that allows individuals to recall 
memories with perfect detail, enabling them to step into a memory and experience it in full. 
Furthermore, the Pensieve allows others to enter and experience another’s memory first-
hand. Of course, the memory sharing process is much more limited outside of this fictional 
world. Notably, the memory sharing process is limited by the constraints of the memory 
sharer’s recall, the language used to communicate that memory, and the perceptions and 
interpretations of the shared memory by the listener. These limitations derive primarily 
from the fact that despite the interactions between the sharer and listener during the 
memory sharing process, their personal experiences are necessarily distinct.  
 Within the memory sharing process, the experience of the memory sharer begins 
with the recall of a specific memory. This memory may be characterized by many 
phenomenological characteristics that may be communicated to others using linguistic 
strategies that emphasize those experiential elements. Based on this communication, the 
memory listener interprets the memory and the information contained in the memory 
influences their perceptions of the memory sharer. This reciprocal process of sharing 
information and changing evaluations is depicted in Figure 3. It is this process of sharing 
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and hearing self-defining memories that is the focus of this paper. Specifically, I will 
explore (a) how individuals use language to share aspects of their temporally extended 
selves with others and (b) how others perceive those communications and incorporate that 
shared information into their understanding of the sharer. In the following sections, I will 
address in detail the distinct experiences of the memory sharer and memory listener.  
 
 
Figure 3 - Depiction of the memory sharing process from sharer to listener and 
perceptual changes from the listener of the sharer. 
 
1.1 Sharing Self-Defining Memories 
The sharing of self-defining memories may be a particularly efficacious way for 
sharing aspects of the temporally extended self. Broadly, self-defining memories contain 
personally meaningful information that is vividly recollected in the moment. This 
personally meaningful information coupled with the vivid and immersive nature of these 
memories suggest that self-defining memories may be an important avenue for sharing the 
temporally extended self with others. When these memories contain information about an 
individual’s work, they may be particularly effective for conveying useful information 
Sharer Listener 
Direction of Memory 
Sharing Process 
Perceived affective 
connection to sharer 
Perceived significance of 
information for sharer 
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about “who I am” to coworkers. In this section, I will focus on the experience of the 
memory sharer. Specifically, I will address (a) the phenomenological characteristics of 
recalled self-defining compared to everyday memories, and (b) the linguistic strategies 
used to communicate those memories to others.  
1.1.1 Phenomenological Memory Characteristics 
As episodic memories are records of individuals’ personal past and are therefore 
almost necessarily a unique record (although some research has begun to investigate the 
social reconstruction of shared memories in groups; Pasupathi, 2001; Hirst & Echterhoff, 
2012), it quickly becomes apparent that a nearly infinite number of memories can be 
recollected. While the content of specific autobiographical memories may vary widely 
from person to person, I contend that the phenomenological characteristics of these 
memories provide a mechanism for exploring memory outcomes irrespective of their 
content. Some memories may be very vivid recollections of experience, while others may 
become dulled with time and forgetting. By describing memories along these 
phenomenological dimensions, I can find common themes in recollected memories despite 
the unique nature of personal experience. 
The phenomenological characteristics of episodic memories not only provide 
useful dimensions to describe specific memories, but also contain information that impacts 
the perceived veracity and utility of the memory. Research on reality monitoring addresses 
this relationship and indicates that memories characterized by high levels of perceptual 
detail were perceived as more real (compared to imagined) than memories with low levels 
of perceptual detail (M. K. Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye, 1988; M. K. Johnson & Raye, 
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1981). A natural extension of this finding would suggest that the reality judgments of a 
recollected memory should influence the validity of the information contained within the 
memory, with memories judged as imagined being less efficacious for conveying 
information than memories judged as real.  
This influence of phenomenological characteristics on the perceived veracity of 
memories is of critical importance for conveying information to the memory remember 
and, potentially, to others with whim this memory is shared. For example, think of a 
mundane memory of turning off the stove (or oven, hairdryer, curling iron, hotplate, etc.) 
after making tea in the morning. Depending on the day, I may have two different memories 
of turning off the stove. First, I know I turned off the stove because I turn it off every 
morning. Or second, I remember turning off the stove because I tripped over my dog while 
reaching for the dial. The second memory is characterized by perceptual and autonoetic 
detail, lending my memory more credibility and providing higher confidence that I did turn 
off the stove this morning. Similarly, my significant other is more likely to believe that I 
turned off the stove if I share the second memory with the vivid phenomenology of tripping 
over my dog than the first memory devoid of specifics. This suggests that highly vivid 
memories may more efficiently convey information to the memory listener. In this section, 
I will extend this basic idea and address the memory characteristics of (a) sensory-
perceptual detail, (b) emotionality, (c) autonoesis, and (d) centrality. 
1.1.1.1 Sensory-perceptual detail 
Specific autobiographical memories are characterized by a host of vivid sensory-
perceptual information that contributes to the feeling of reliving the original event. In his 
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basic systems approach, Rubin (2006, 2012) suggests that specific autobiographical 
memories are multimodal and can involve experiential elements from all the senses (i.e., 
vision, hearing, smell, taste, touch, and kinesthesis) in addition to varying in spatial, 
temporal, emotional, and narrative content. Furthermore, he proposes that these rich 
memories are constructed through the interactions of basic systems that serve the various 
experiential elements. For example, the vivid imagery in a specific memory is constructed 
from information held in the basic visual system, auditory elements from the basic auditory 
system, etc. The coordination of these systems produces a rich, specific autobiographical 
memory.  
Of course, not all memories are experienced the same. Some may be accompanied 
by sharp visual imagery while others are more auditory. Generally, memories with more 
pronounced sensory-perceptual characteristics are judged by the individual recollecting the 
memory as providing more “real” information than memories with muted sensory 
information (M. K. Johnson, 2006; M. K. Johnson et al., 1988; M. K. Johnson, Hashtroudi, 
& Lindsay, 1993; M. K. Johnson & Raye, 1981). These judgments are an important 
component of daily functioning as they allow individuals’ to “exert control over [their] 
own opinions and beliefs” (M. K. Johnson et al., 1993, p. 3). For example, memories that 
are confidently rated as real (not imagined) or confidently sourced (I remember reading 
this in the New York Times, not the National Enquirer) may be perceived as providing 
more credible information. Furthermore, these sensory-perceptual characteristics tend to 
covary, suggesting that some memories are, on average, more immersive than others 
(Takahashi & Shimizu, 2007). As self-defining memories are vivid recollections of goal 
attainment or goal failure, they should contain more sensory-perceptual characteristics than 
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everyday memories. An initial study comparing autistic and normal adults supports this 
proposed relationship, finding that self-defining memories were rated as more vivid than 
everyday memories (Crane, Goddard, & Pring, 2010). Extending this to a working 
population, I propose that self-defining work memories contain more sensory-perceptual 
details than everyday work memories.  
H1: Self-defining work memories are characterized by higher levels of sensory-
perceptual details than everyday work memories.  
1.1.1.2 Emotionality 
Emotional memories are phenomenologically different from non-emotional 
memories. Memory emotionality is related to memory vividness, with emotional memories 
being more vivid than non-emotional memories (Rubin & Kozin, 1984; Talarico, LaBar, 
& Rubin, 2004). In addition to memory vividness, emotional memories are also recalled 
from different perspectives than non-emotional memories. Memories for emotional events 
are more likely to be recalled from a field perspective (i.e., from the original point of view 
where the individual is looking out on the scene as it unfolds) while unemotional memories 
are more likely to be recalled from an observer perspective (i.e., from the perspective of an 
observer watching the scene; (Berntsen, 1996; D'Argembeau, Comblain, & Van der 
Linden, 2003; Nigro & Neisser, 1983). This emphasis on the first-person experience for an 
emotional memory, compared to the third-person experience in an unemotional memory, 
suggests that the emotionality of a recollected memory may be particularly important for 
memory phenomenology. 
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 Furthermore, self-defining memories may be more emotional than everyday 
memories. As self-defining memories are records of long-term goal attainment or failure, 
they may be particularly emotional records of past experience. This is supported by 
research comparing memory recall in autistic and normal adults, which found that self-
defining memories were rated as more emotional than everyday memories (Crane et al., 
2010). Once again extending this effect to a working population, I propose that self-
defining work memories are more emotional than everyday work memories.  
H2: Self-defining work memories are characterized by higher levels of emotionality 
than everyday work memories.  
1.1.1.3 Autonoesis 
Autonoesis refers to “the special kind of consciousness that allows us to be aware 
of subjective time in which events happened” (Tulving, 2002, p. 2) and allows for mental 
time travel. This phenomenon allows the rememberer to travel back in time and 
consciously re-experience his or her past in the present moment when recalling an episodic 
memory. This re-experiencing of the past through autonoesis is perhaps best captured by 
the remember-know paradigm (Tulving, 1985). Stated most simply, we know many facts 
about our world and ourselves. For example, I know I was born in North Carolina, attended 
a four-year university, and applied for graduate school during a hectic senior year. I know 
these things about myself similar to how I know my colleague took a gap year before 
graduate school. Each of these are known as a semantic fact, not as a remembered 
experience. However, I remember my first acceptance to graduate school. I remember 
where I was standing (in my small, college-apartment kitchen), I remember the phone 
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ringing (hearing the sound and waiting a couple of seconds before answering to take a deep 
breath), and I remember the emotional component of the event (the overwhelming relief of 
finally being accepted into a program). The key distinction is that “I” do not just know I 
was accepted. I remember this in all its vivid, emotional detail.  
 Of course, not all memories are experientially recollected. In his seminal paper, 
Tulving (1985) distinguishes between autonoetic and noetic consciousness. While 
autonoetic memory is associated with episodic memory or the episodic elements of 
autobiographical memories (Conway, 2009), noetic memory is associated with known 
information in semantic memory. In a series of studies, Tulving (1985) demonstrates 
changes in autonoetic consciousness, suggesting that memories for an event can be 
characterized by varying levels of autonoetic and noetic remembering. More recently, 
D'Argembeau and Van der Linden (2008) found that autobiographical memories vary in 
the extent to which they are re-experienced. Specifically, they found that memories for 
positive events were associated with higher levels of re-experiencing than memories for 
negative events. Continuing in this vein, I posit that self-defining work memories will be 
characterized by greater autonoetic remembering than everyday work memories. While 
self-defining and everyday memories may contain episodic elements (Conway, 2009), the 
emotional and goal-relevant nature of self-defining work memories may make them 
particularly suited to autonoetic remembering.  
H3: Self-defining work memories are characterized by higher levels of autonoetic 
recollection than everyday work memories.  
1.1.1.4 Centrality 
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In addition to the phenomenological characteristics of sensory-perceptual detail, 
emotionality, and autonoesis, self-defining and everyday memories may also differ along 
how central the memory is to their sense of self. Self-defining memories, as discussed 
above, are records of progress towards long-term goals. However, these memories are more 
than just summary records, but contain information that has been incorporated into the 
person’s sense of self. In a study of self-defining memories and personal strivings, 98% of 
reported memories were related to at least one personally generated striving (Moffitt & 
Singer, 1994). Breaking this down into more generalizable categories, Sutin and Robins 
(2005) found that the valence of self-defining memory is related to memory motivation, 
such that negative self-defining memories are related to power motivations while positive 
self-defining memories are related to achievement and intimacy motivations. These studies 
demonstrate the importance of self-defining memories in understanding individuals’ 
motivations.  
 Additional research has looked not only at the relationship between self-defining 
memories and motivation, but how self-defining memories are incorporated into an 
integrative understanding of the self extended in time. Research has indicated that the 
perceived impact of a self-defining memory is related to the amount of meaning-making 
associated with an affective response to the memory (Wood & Conway, 2006). This 
meaning-making, or autobiographical reasoning, refers to the “self-reflective thinking or 
talking about the past that involves forming links between elements of one’s life and the 
self in an attempt to relate one’s personal past and present” (Habermas & Bluck, 2000, p. 
749). This process allows self-defining memories, or “key scenes” as they are referred to 
in the narrative literature (McAdams, Reynolds, Lewis, Patten, & Bowman, 2001), to be 
 15
integrated into an individual’s life story where they are thematically organized. The themes 
uncovered in these key scenes have been related to well-being and attitude evaluations of 
life and the self. Specifically, key scenes characterized by personal redemption (McAdams 
et al., 2001) and growth (Bauer & McAdams, 2004; Bauer, McAdams, & Sakaeda, 2005) 
are associated with high well-being. Similarly, redemptive themes in life-narrative 
episodes were associated with higher life satisfaction, higher self-esteem, and lower levels 
of depression. The integration of these self-defining memories into larger life narratives 
indicates that these memories may be important components of an individual’s sense of 
self. Everyday memories, on the other hand, are unlikely to be incorporated into narrative 
understandings of the self or be strongly connected to individuals’ long-term motivations. 
The construction of a work narrative is an important component of identity work, and self-
defining work memories may be an important component of that constructive process 
(Ibarra & Barbulescu, 2010; Singer, Blagov, Berry, & Oost, 2013). This suggests that self-
defining work memories, compared to everyday work memories, are characterized by 
higher centrality to an individual’s sense of self. 
H4: Self-defining work memories are characterized by higher levels of centrality 
than everyday work memories.  
 In this section, I have described the characteristics of recollected memories. 
Specifically, I have posited that recollected self-defining memories are characterized by 
higher sensory-perceptual detail, emotionality, autonoesis, and self-centrality than 
everyday memories. In general, I posit that shared self-defining memories are potent 
conveyors of information because of the immersive and vivid nature of these memories. 
However, recollecting a vivid memory is only the first step in the memory sharing process. 
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In the next section, I will describe how the characteristics of recollected memories may be 
shared with others using language during the memory sharing process.  
1.1.2 Linguistic Properties of Shared Memories 
When sharing personal experience with others, we are limited by the words we use 
to describe and convey those memories. Therefore, the words used in memory sharing are 
likely particularly important for conveying information from the sharer to the listener. As 
discussed above, the phenomenological characteristics of memories are an important 
component of a recollected memory that can influence judgments of the credibility of the 
memory (M. K. Johnson et al., 1988; M. K. Johnson et al., 1993; M. K. Johnson & Raye, 
1981). Similarly, I suggest the phenomenological characteristics of shared memories may 
influence the perceived credibility of the memory for the listener. Memories that are shared 
using linguistic strategies that highlight the vivid and immersive experience of the memory 
may be more efficacious conveyors of information.  
 Researchers have begun to explore the role of language in conveying underlying 
psychological processes using validated dictionaries from the Linguistic Inquiry and Word 
Count (LIWC, Pennebaker, Francis, & Booth, 2001) program. The LIWC method uses a 
word count strategy that assesses “the content (what is being said) and style (how it is being 
said)” of text to uncover psychological information (Pennebaker, Mehl, & Niederhoffer, 
2003, p. 550). Applying this to the memory sharing process, the linguistic strategies used 
in memory sharing may convey information about the phenomenological characteristics of 
the shared memory. In this section, I will review the use of (a) perceptual process words, 
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(b) emotional tone, (c) first-person pronouns, and (d) authentic tone during the memory 
sharing process.  
I have already proposed reliable differences between self-defining and everyday 
work memories and their associated phenomenological characteristics. Thus, the linguistic 
strategies used to share self-defining and everyday memories should, broadly, be divided 
along these lines. However, I also recognize that there may be a great deal of variability in 
the phenomenological characteristics of recollected memories within these broad self-
defining and everyday categorizations. As I am interested in the ability of language to 
convey these recollected phenomenological characteristics, I will organize my hypotheses 
not along the self-defining and everyday memory divide, but along the general 
phenomenology continuum. Memories that are recollected as high on sensory-perceptual 
detail, regardless of the delineation between self-defining and everyday work memories, 
are likely to be shared using linguistic strategies that emphasize that detail.  
Specifically, for sensory-perceptual detail, the use of perceptual process words in 
memory sharing may be related to the number of sensory-perceptual details in the 
recollected memory. The perceptual process words dictionary describes words related to 
seeing, hearing, and feeling and contains words such as look, heard, and feeling 
(Pennebaker, Boyd, Jordan, & Blackburn, 2015). Memories that contain more sensory-
perceptual details contain information related to what the memory sharer saw, heard, felt, 
etc. Thus, these memories are likely to be described using words that convey that 
information.  
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H5: Memories characterized by high levels of sensory-perceptual detail will be 
shared using more perceptual process words than memories characterized by low 
levels of sensory-perceptual detail.  
Similarly, emotional memories are likely to be described using words that convey 
greater emotional tone. Bohanek, Fivush, and Walker (2005) found that narratives of 
positive emotional events contained more positive emotion words while narratives of 
negative emotional events contained more negative emotion words. This pattern of effects 
was replicated by Kahn, Tobin, Massey, and Anderson (2007), who found that amusing 
autobiographical memories were described using more positive feeling words while sad 
autobiographical memories were described using more negative emotion words. Taken 
together, this suggests that highly emotional memories will be shared using more emotion 
tone words than unemotional memories. 
H6: Memories characterized by high levels of emotionality will be shared using 
more emotional tone words than memories characterized by low levels of 
emotionality.  
The use of first-person pronouns may be related to autonoetic reliving of a 
recollected memory. Tausczik and Pennebaker (2010) argue that function words, such as 
personal pronouns, can reflect the allocation of attention in the speaker. Thus, individuals 
who are more focused on personal experience are likely to use more first-person pronoun 
words. This position is supported by research indicating that depressed individuals used 
more first-person singular pronouns than individuals who had never been depressed, 
presumably because of the increased self-focus associated with depression (Rude, Gortner, 
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& Pennebaker, 2004). Memories that are characterized by strong autonoetic characteristics 
may be associated with increased self-focus due to the mental reliving of the event. An 
unpublished dissertation found that autobiographical memories were characterized by 
significantly more first-person pronouns than intentionally fabricated autobiographical 
memories (Justice, 2012). As intentionally fabricated memories cannot be autonoetically 
recollected because they did not occur, this suggests that the use of first-person pronouns 
can approximate the amount of mental reliving of a memory. Extending this to the current 
study, I posit memories characterized by high levels of autonoesis will be shared using 
more first-person pronouns.  
H7: Memories characterized by high levels of autonoesis will be shared using more 
first-person pronouns than memories characterized by low levels of autonoesis.  
Finally, the centrality of the recollected memory to the sharer’s sense of self may 
also be communicated using a more authentic linguistic style. Authentic language is used 
in texts that are rated as more honest, personal, and disclosing (Pennebaker, Booth, Boyd, 
& Francis, 2015). Memories that are perceived as more central to an individual’s life story 
may therefore be conveyed using language that emphasizes the personal nature of the 
memory. The relationship between memory centrality and authenticity has received 
tangential support in a study of nostalgic memory. Specifically, the researchers found that 
individuals rated nostalgic memories as leading to stronger feelings of authenticity 
compared to positive or ordinary memories (Stephan, Sedikides, & Wildschut, 2012). 
Extending this to the memory sharing process, I posit that memories high on self-centrality 
will be shared using a more authentic linguistic style.  
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H8: Memories characterized by high levels of self-centrality will be shared using 
more authentic tone words than memories characterized by low levels of self-
centrality.  
1.1.3 Summary of Memory Sharer Experience 
The memory sharing process is composed of two primary players: the memory 
sharer and the memory listener. In this section, I have reviewed the experience of the 
memory sharer. First, the recall of a specific episodic memory can be broadly categorized 
into self-defining and everyday memories. Following this broad categorization, these 
memories can be further described by their phenomenological characteristics of sensory-
perceptual detail, emotionality, autonoesis, and self-centrality. Finally, these memories can 
be shared with others using linguistic strategies that emphasize and communicate these 
phenomenological characteristics to others. This process from recall to language describes 
the memory sharing process from the perspective of the memory sharer. In the following 
section, I will transition from the experience of the memory sharer to the memory listener.  
1.2 Hearing Self-Defining Memories 
 The second critical piece of the memory sharing process is the listener’s perspective 
when hearing a self-defining memory. It is an obvious yet important point that the sharing 
of a memory from the sharer to the receiver is limited by the listener’s perspective of the 
shared memory. While a recollected memory may be highly vivid, emotional, and 
autonoetic, the listener cannot access those recollective characteristics directly. Unlike the 
Pensieve in J.K. Rowling’s novels, we are unable to enter others’ memories to experience 
them for ourselves (Rowling, 2000, 2003, 2005, 2007). Thus, the memory sharing process 
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is limited by the perceptions of the memory receiver. In this section, I will address the 
memory sharing process from the listener’s perspective, focusing on the influence of (a) 
hearing self-defining memories on work-related outcomes and (b) the perceived 
phenomenological characteristics of the shared memory on memory efficacy.  
1.2.1 Self-defining memories and work outcomes 
 The sharing of self-defining memories provides a mechanism for sharing aspects 
of the temporally extended self with others. When these memories are heard by others, the 
communicated information may influence the development of affective connections with 
the sharer and perceptions of work experience for the sharer. While research has focused 
primarily on why individuals share memories with others (Alea & Bluck, 2003), in this 
section I will focus on the experience of the memory receiver. Specifically, I will outline 
how hearing self-defining memories can (a) elicit affective connections of likability, 
affective trust, and empathy and (b) influence perceptions of work meaningfulness, insight, 
and cognitive rust in the receiver for the sender.  
1.2.1.1 Elicit affective connections 
Theoretical models of autobiographical memory sharing have posited that 
individuals share memories to aid in the development and maintenance of affective 
connections (Alea & Bluck, 2003). In this section, I will delve into how the social sharing 
of self-defining memories can elicit likability, affective trust, and empathy across the 
listener-sharer dyad. Specifically, I will explore how hearing a self-defining memory will 
aid in the development of affective connections in the listener for the sharer.  
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1.2.1.1.1 Likability 
As workers develop affective connections with coworkers and supervisors, they 
often aim to be viewed, at the most basic level, as likable. Indeed, a central component of 
impression management research delves into how individuals try to enhance their work 
image to be viewed as more likable and effective employees (Bolino, Klotz, & Daniels, 
2014). Being viewed as likable by peers and supervisors does have its benefits, particularly 
when ratings are subjective. For example, impression management strategies used to 
enhance likability are positively related to career success (Judge & Bretz Jr, 1994), job 
performance (Ferris, Judge, Rowland, & Fitzgibbons, 1994), organizational citizenship 
behaviors (Bolino, Varela, Bande, & Turnley, 2006), and ratings of contribution in a 
student group (Weisband & Atwater, 1999).  
The sharing of self-defining memories may be a particularly potent way to establish 
affective bonds, such as likability, through increased self-disclosure. As self-defining 
memories are records of personally meaningful and emotional events (Singer & Salovey, 
1993), the sharing of these memories may be seen as a type of self-disclosure to others. 
The self-disclosure associated with memory sharing may be an important component of 
developing likability across the sharer-listener dyad. A meta-analytic review of self-
disclosure suggests that people who engage in intimate self-disclosure were more liked 
than individuals who self-disclosed less intimate details about their life (Collins & Miller, 
1994). As the sharing of self-defining memories may be a particularly intimate form of 
self-disclosure, hearing a self-defining memory may lead to increased perceptions of 
likability for the memory sharer.  
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H9: Hearing self-defining work memories, compared to everyday work memories, 
will increase perceptions of likability for the sharer.  
1.2.1.1.2 Trust 
Trust, defined as “a psychological state comprising the intention to accept 
vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another” 
(Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998, p. 395), has long been considered a vital part of 
working relationships. It has been related to important attitudinal and behavioral outcomes, 
such as job satisfaction, extra-role behaviors, and team performance (Colquitt, Scott, & 
LePine, 2007; De Jong, Dirks, & Gillespie, 2016; Dirks & Ferrin, 2002). Affective views 
of trust, compared to cognitive views of trust, rely upon notions of emotional bonds that 
arise from individual and social interaction (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). I propose that the 
hearing of self-defining memories can facilitate the development of affective trust.  
As suggested above, self-defining memories may be a particularly compelling form 
of self-disclosure. Furthermore, previous research has found a positive relationship 
between self-disclosure and trust, with conscious disclosure and greater amount of 
disclosure related to increased trust (Wheeless & Grotz, 1977). Extending these findings 
to the memory sharer, this suggests that the hearing of self-defining work memories can 
help facilitate the development and maintenance of emotional bonds that are required for 
affective trust among coworkers.  
H10: Hearing self-defining work memories, compared to everyday work memories, 
will increase perceptions of affective trust for the sharer.  
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1.2.1.1.3 Empathy 
In addition to aiding the development of trust, the hearing of self-defining memories 
can facilitate the development of empathy. Empathy is the affective response resulting from 
“one’s perceptions (directly experienced or imagined) and understanding (cognitive 
empathy) of the stimulus emotion, with recognition that the source of the emotion is not 
one’s own” (Cuff, Brown, Taylor, & Howat, 2016, p. 150). Essentially, empathy is the 
matching of affective feelings to the stimulus emotion. This congruent affective experience 
allows for the vicarious sharing of others’ positive or negative emotions (Morelli, 
Lieberman, & Zaki, 2015; Morelli, Rameson, & Lieberman, 2014). A crucial component 
of this empathic reaction is the ability to take another’s perspective (Zaki & Ochsner, 
2012), especially for emotional experiences that require a context to be understood. For 
example, an unambiguous pain event, such as cutting your finger, does not require a context 
to understand and can generate empathy automatically (Morelli et al., 2014). However, 
more complex emotions, such as anxiety or happiness, typically require a context to 
understand. Affective reactions at work are rarely as unambiguous as physical pain, 
suggesting that the context of an affective event is important to the development of 
empathic reactions.  
The importance of empathic connections with others has been widely recognized 
in the social work and medical fields (Raab, 2014), but these connections may be just as 
important in ‘normal’ workplaces. In fact, empathy has been related to increased prosocial 
behavior (Morelli et al., 2014), work engagement and extra-role performance (Bakker, 
2007), improved social interactions (Gruhn, Rebucal, Diehl, Lumley, & Labouvie-Vief, 
2008), and decreased burnout (Miller, Stiff, & Ellis, 1988; Wagaman, Geiger, Shockley, & 
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Segal, 2015). Furthermore, leader and manager empathy has been related to higher quality 
exchange relationships (Mahsud, Yukl, & Prussia, 2010) and lower levels of somatic 
complaints (Scott, Colquitt, Paddock, & Judge, 2010) with subordinates. This suggests that 
empathic connections are an important social feature in work relations. Initial research has 
found that sharing autobiographical memories can elicit empathy for a fictitious individual 
describing chronic back pain in a vignette (Bluck, Baron, Ainsworth, Gesselman, & Gold, 
2013). Along this vein, I propose that the hearing of self-defining work memories provides 
the information needed for the listener to understand the sharer’s perspective and enable 
empathy among coworkers. 
H11: Hearing self-defining work memories, compared to everyday work memories, 
will increase feelings of empathy for the sharer.  
1.2.1.2 Convey personal information 
In addition to eliciting affective connections, the sharing of memories can be used 
to convey important information to others (Alea & Bluck, 2003). In this section, I will 
describe how the hearing of self-defining memories can convey personally relevant 
information about work meaningfulness, insight, and cognitive trust. Similar to the 
elicitation of affective connections above, I propose that shared memories influence the 
listener’s perceptions of the sharer. As hearing a self-defining memory can influence 
affective connections in the listener for the sharer, hearing memories can convey personal 
information to the listener about the sharer.  
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1.2.1.2.1 Meaningfulness 
Self-defining memories may be particularly informative for conveying work as 
meaningful. As defined by Rosso, Dekas, and Wrzesniewski (2010), I use the term 
“meaningful” or “meaningfulness” to refer to work that has significance (p. 95). In their 
seminal paper, Rosso et al. (2010) argue that the self is the source of meaningful work and 
suggest that “individuals’ values, motivations, and beliefs influence their perceptions of 
the meaning of work” (p. 95). I posit that self-defining memories contain information that 
influences perceptions of work meaningfulness through these same channels. Work that is 
aligned with an individual’s higher order values, motivations, and beliefs can contribute to 
the perception of work meaningfulness. In this section, I will demonstrate that self-defining 
memories contain information related to these processes and argue that the connection of 
self-defining memories to long-term goals will influence perceptions of work 
meaningfulness.  
 First, self-defining memories contain information about individuals’ work values. 
Work values are defined as “the end states people desire and feel they ought to be able to 
realize through working” (Nord, Brief, Atieh, & Doherty, 1990, p. 21). This emphasis on 
long-term goals in work values is reflected in self-defining memories, which contain 
records of goal attainment/failure towards long-term goals (Singer & Salovey, 1993). 
Furthermore, the salience of goals can allow self-defining memories to serve as motivators. 
Specifically, Pillemer (2001) describes memories related to starting points or turning points 
in long-term goal progress. The recollection of these memories can serve as continued 
motivation by making salient instances of goal attainment or goal failure during 
recollection. Finally, self-defining memories contain information that helps establish the 
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beliefs people have about their work. Specifically, a single memory can serve as an 
“enduring reminder of how the world works” and can provide “persistent affirmation of 
what is valuable or continued warning of what to avoid” (Pillemer, 2001, p. 128). These 
vivid memories contain valuable information that extends beyond the constraints of the 
original situation and the repeated remembering provides continued grounding of the belief 
system. 
Work self-defining memories connect instances of work events to long-term goals 
in the temporally extended self. Furthermore, these memories contain information that 
informs individuals’ values, motivations, and beliefs, which are thought to be foundational 
for crafting perceptions of meaningful work. The sharing of these memories with others 
may be a particularly potent mechanism for developing work meaningfulness in the sharer 
due to the information conveyed and subsequent sensemaking (Rosso et al., 2010). 
Interpersonal sensemaking describes the “critical role played by others in the organization 
in the valuing and devaluing of the work that employees do, the roles employees hold, and 
the people employees are” (Wrzesniewski, Dutton, & Debebe, 2003, p. 95). When 
employees engage in interpersonal sensemaking, they interpret the cues provided by others 
to understand the significance of their job, role, and self at work. Thus, hearing a self-
defining work memory will influence perceptions of the memory sharer’s work 
meaningfulness by conveying personally meaningful information that highlights the 
connection between the memory sharer’s long-term goals and their work.  
H12: Hearing self-defining work memories, compared to everyday work memories, 
will increase perceptions of the memory sharer’s work meaningfulness.  
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1.2.1.2.2 Insights 
The hearing of self-defining memories may also allow for vicarious learning in the 
listener. The recollection and sharing of self-defining memories prioritizes the role of 
personal experience. Research has begun to explicitly recognize the importance of 
experience-based learning that prioritizes experience for individual and organizational 
learning (Andresen, Boud, & Cohen, 2000; Argote & Miron-Spektor, 2011; Carroll, 
Rudolph, & Hatakenaka, 2002). However, simply having an experience is not sufficient 
for learning to occur. Reflection over the experience is a critical component of learning 
(Daudelin, 1996). While learning does focus on the “immediate personal experience [as] 
the focal point for learning” (Kolb, 1984, p. 21), it requires subsequent observation and 
reflection to create abstract concepts and generalizations from the experience. I propose 
that the recollection and sharing of self-defining memories are particularly suited to convey 
insights gleaned from previous experience.  
 As already discussed, self-defining memories are vivid records of goal attainment 
or goal failure. This goal-relevant information can be educational for future behavior and 
can potentially be generalized beyond the initial memory encoding context. Pillemer’s 
(2001) discussion of analogous events directly addresses this educational perspective of 
self-defining memories. Specifically, he posits that analogous events inform future 
behavior by connecting a specific memory with themes that can be extended to new 
contexts. This allows a single memory to provide information that can be applied to diverse 
life events. For an example, a college student describes being caught taking a shortcut on 
a class project:  
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A second influential experience that I can recall involved an Art History paper. I 
wrote about a sculpture from a picture I had, rather than going to the museum to view it as 
we had been instructed. When I received the paper back it had no grade, but instead a note 
which said "see me." Upon meeting with the instructor I was informed that the piece about 
which I wrote was currently being restored. Since I had not followed instructions and 
written about a piece I had seen, I was required to write another paper. In addition to being 
extremely embarrassed, I learned a valuable lesson about not taking shortcuts. (Pillemer, 
Picariello, Law & Reichman, 1996, p. 331; also cited in Pillemer, 2001) 
This memory describes a single event, but also contains information that can be 
generalized to other aspects of the student’s life. In fact, the student even indicated that the 
specific memory is recalled “when the temptation to take a shortcut is present” (Pillemer, 
2001, p. 128), demonstrating the utility of a single vivid memory to apply to a variety of 
thematically similar situations and influence behavior. This suggests that self-defining 
memories can contain insights that can be generalized to diverse situations. 
 Preliminary research has begun to investigate the role of self-defining memories in 
learning. Specifically, self-defining memories have been compared to lesson learning or 
insightful learning (Thorne, McLean, & Lawrence, 2004). Lessons refer to the concrete 
learning that can be applied in the future to a similar situation while insightful learning 
refers to the “broader meanings that extend to other parts of the self beyond those indicated 
in the narrated event” (McLean & Pratt, 2006, p. 715). Thorne and colleagues (2004) found 
that self-defining memories were more likely to contain insights than lessons, especially if 
the self-defining memories were achievement-oriented. Furthermore, subsequent analyses 
found that shared memories containing insights were perceived by the sharer as being more 
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positively received than shared memories containing lessons. While this does not directly 
address learning, it does convey two important points: (a) self-defining memories can 
contain insightful information and (b) the sharing of this information is generally positively 
received.  
 Extending this to the memory receiver, hearing self-defining memories may lead to 
learning in the listener. This vicarious learning has already been noted by Orr (1986), who 
described the sharing of “war stories” among copier technicians. These “war stories” 
describe examples of difficult diagnoses of broken copiers. These stories are shared 
presumably to communicate valuable information to other technicians. Specifically, Orr 
(1986) suggests that the social sharing with “one’s associates constitutes the mechanism 
for incorporating the diagnostic experience into the community expertise” and “these 
anecdotes are often remembered and used or referred to during the diagnosis of other 
difficult problems” (p. 62). The sharing of these memories can provide information to 
coworkers as well as an avenue to vicariously learn from the successes and failures of 
others. While these “war story” memories address relatively mundane diagnostic problems, 
the sharing of self-defining memories can be used to communicate insights with others and 
allow them to learn broader life lessons from the successes and failures of coworkers. Thus, 
I suggest that the hearing of self-defining work memories will lead to higher perceptions 
of insightfulness in the listener for the sharer.  
H13: Hearing self-defining work memories, compared to everyday work memories 
will increase perceptions of the sharer’s insightfulness.  
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1.2.1.2.3 Cognitive trust 
Finally, the sharing of self-defining memories may aid in the development of 
cognitive trust. Cognitive trust is based primarily on the perception that the individual is 
reliable (D. Johnson & Grayson, 2005; McAllister, 1995). As self-defining memories are 
vivid recollections of goal progress or goal failure, the sharing of these memories may 
provide the listener with information on how the sharer handles a work success or work 
failure. This information, in turn, may decrease the perceived variability around potential 
behavioral responses to work events, leading to increased perceptions of reliability and 
cognitive trust.  
H14: Hearing self-defining work memories, compared to everyday work memories, 
will increase perceptions of the sharer’s cognitive trust.  
1.2.1.3 Summary of outcomes.  
Self-defining memories provide personally meaningful information about the 
temporally extended self. Hearing these memories can influence the development of 
affective connections and convey personally meaningful information to others. More 
specifically, hearing self-defining memories can lead to the development of trust and 
empathy and influence perceptions of work meaningfulness and insight in the listener for 
the sharer. Of course, not all shared memories are identical. In the next section, I will 
address how the perceived phenomenological characteristics of shared memories may 
influence the memory-sharing efficacy.  
1.2.2 Perceived Phenomenological Characteristics and Memory Efficacy 
 32
Thus far, I have suggested that hearing self-defining memories, compared to 
everyday memories, will influence the development of affective connections and 
perceptions of work experience. However, not all memories are equally influential. As I 
addressed in my discussion of the memory sharer, recollected memories can be 
characterized by varying levels of phenomenological characteristics. Namely, memories 
may be described by their sensory-perceptual detail, emotionality, autonoesis, and self-
centrality. Furthermore, these phenomenological characteristics can be shared with others 
using specific linguistic strategies. Extending this to the memory receiver, I suggest that 
the perceived phenomenological characteristics of a shared memory may influence the 
efficacy of that memory to serve its affective and informational outcomes.  
The perceived phenomenological characteristics of shared memories may contain 
additional informational weight beyond the content of the memory. Previous research has 
indicated that the phenomenology of a recollected memory can influence the perceived 
credibility of the memory. Specifically, individuals are more likely to rate their memories 
as real if they contain more perceptual and emotional detail (M. K. Johnson, 2006; M. K. 
Johnson et al., 1988). This suggests that the phenomenological characteristics of a memory 
can have important implications for how the information contained in the memory is used. 
If a memory is judged to be imagined, the information contained in the memory may not 
be used by the remember. If, on the other hand, the memory is judged as real, then the 
information contained in the memory may be used to inform future attitudes and behaviors.  
Extending this to the memory sharing process, shared immersive memories may be 
more efficacious for influencing outcomes. The phenomenological characteristics of the 
memory may influence perceptions of the shared memories’ credibility or veracity, thereby 
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influencing how the information contained in the memory is used by the memory listener. 
Just as recalled memories are rated as more real when they are characterized by more 
pronounced sensory-perceptual details (M. K. Johnson, 2006), shared memories that 
emphasize perceptual processes will be viewed as more credible providers of information. 
An experimental study on interpersonal reality monitoring supports this claim, as vignettes 
with more perceptual detail were rated as more believable (M. K. Johnson, Bush, & 
Mitchell, 1998). Additional work on eyewitness testimony found that laypeople rated 
accounts with more congruent emotion as more credible than accounts with incongruent or 
no emotion (Wessel, Drevland, Eilertsen, & Magnussen, 2006). These vivid and emotional 
memories are perceived as more credible, suggesting they are better able to convey 
information from the sharer to the listener. Extending this to memory sharing at work, this 
suggests that immersive memories generally will be more efficacious for influencing 




Figure 4 - Depiction of the memory listener process where affective and 
informational outcomes are influenced by memory type and memory immersion. 
 
H15a-c: The effect of memory type on affective memory outcomes is moderated 
by memory immersion, such that highly immersive self-defining work memories 
are related to higher ratings of (H15a) likability, (H15b) affective trust, (H15c) 
empathy for the memory sharer than non-immersive self-defining work memories.  
H15d-f: The effect of memory type on informational memory outcomes is 
moderated by memory immersion, such that highly immersive self-defining work 
memories are related to higher ratings of (H15d) work meaningfulness, (H15e) 
insight, and (H15f) cognitive trust for the memory sharer than non-immersive self-
defining work memories.  
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The second half of the memory sharing process addresses the memory listener, or the 
person who is hearing the memory from the memory sharer. In this section, I have focused 
on the experience of the memory listener in the memory sharing process. First, I 
overviewed how hearing a self-defining memory from a coworker may influence the 
development of affective connections and inform perceptions of work experience for the 
coworker. Specifically, hearing self-defining work memories may lead to higher levels of 
likability affective trust, and empathy, while enhancing perceptions of work 
meaningfulness, insight, and cognitive trust in the memory listener for the memory sharer. 
Of course, the phenomenological characteristics may also influence the efficacy of the 
memory sharing process. I also overviewed how highly immersive shared memories may 
be better able to influence affective and informational outcomes.  
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CHAPTER 2. METHOD 
 To explore the social uses of self-defining memories at work, two studies were 
conducted to investigate the role of the memory sharer and memory listener. The first 
study, focusing on the memory sharer, investigated the phenomenology of a recalled 
memory and the linguistic strategies used to share the memory. The second study, focusing 
on the memory listener, addressed the perceived phenomenology of the shared memory 
and its influence on affective and informational outcomes. Each study will be addressed in 
greater detail below. 
2.1 Study 1: Sharing Self-Defining Memories 
 This study addresses the experience of the memory sharer in the memory sharing 
process by exploring the recall of a specific memory, the phenomenological characteristics 
of the memory, and the linguistic strategies used to share the memory with others. 
Recollected self-defining and everyday memories are hypothesized to be characterized by 
different phenomenological characteristics, with self-defining memories described by 
stronger (H1) sensory-perceptual detail, (H2) emotionality, (H3) autonoetic, and (H4) self-
centrality characteristics. Furthermore, memories will be described and shared using 
language that reflects this memory phenomenology. Specifically, memories characterized 
by high levels of sensory-perceptual detail, emotionality, autonoesis, and self-centrality 
will be shared using more (H5) perceptual process words, (H6) emotional tone words, (H7) 
first-person pronouns, and (H8) authentic tone words, respectively. By focusing on the 
memory sharer exclusively, I can explore how a recollected memory is translated from 
experience to words in the memory sharing process.  
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To address these hypotheses, participants were recruited from Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk to complete a study on work-relevant memories. Participants were asked 
to complete a writing task describing a work-relevant memory (self-defining or everyday 
memory) and complete a series of questionnaires addressing the phenomenological 
characteristics of their recollected memory. The recollected memory text was subjected to 
linguistic analysis using the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC, Pennebaker, 
Francis, & Booth, 2001) program to assess how the memories are shared through language. 
The specifics of the method are shared in greater detail below.  
2.1.1 Participants.  
Participants were full-time employees (working 30+ hours per week) living in the 
United States collected through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Mechanical Turk is a 
crowdsourcing platform for recruiting and compensating people for completing a variety 
of tasks, including participation in online experiments. Many researchers still harbor 
concerns about the validity and reliability of results collected from a Mechanical Turk 
sample, despite evidence that Mechanical Turk samples perform similarly to other 
convenience samples. Specifically, Mechanical Turk samples (a) met or exceeded the 
psychometric standards for individual difference measures associated with published 
research (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011), (b) exhibited high test-retest reliability 
(Buhrmester et al., 2011; Shapiro, Chandler, & Mueller, 2013), and (c) performed similarly 
to a subject sample pool on a variety of tasks (Crump, McDonnell, & Gureckis, 2013; 
Horton, Rand, & Zeckhauser, 2011; Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010; Shariff & 
Norenzayan, 2007). This suggests that a Mechanical Turk sample may provide data of a 
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similar quality to other more traditional convenience research samples, such as student 
participant pools, other Internet samples, or snowball samples (Landers & Behrend, 2015).  
An RMSEA power analysis was conducted to determine the proposed sample size 
for a path analysis (Preacher & Coffman, 2006). In the power analysis, acceptable model 
fit was defined as RMSEA < .05. For the desired power level of 1-β = .80, a total sample 
size of 147 participants was needed. To account for possible participant attrition, a target 
sample size of 160 participants was set.  
Responses from a total of 163 participants were collected. Responses from six 
participants were discarded for providing inappropriate memories (e.g., memories that 
were completely unrelated to work or memories that were less than 500 words long) or 
failing attention check items, resulting in a sample size of 157 participant responses. The 
sample is 39% male with a mean age of 34.8 years (SD = 9.11 years) and a mean job tenure 
of 6.14 years (SD = 6.86 years). The sample largely identified as white/Caucasian (73.25%) 
and reported an average household income between $50,000 and $59,999. All respondents 
reported a high school degree or an equivalent, with 32% of participants reporting a 
bachelor degree and 22% of participants reporting some college, but no degree. These 
sample characteristics largely match characteristics of a 2,896 participant Mechanical Turk 
sample, suggesting that the current sample is representative of Mechanical Turk workers 
generally. Participants took, on average, 41 minutes to complete the survey (SD = 22 
minutes).  
2.1.2 Protocol.  
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Participants were randomly assigned to the self-defining memory task 
(experimental condition) or the everyday memory task (control condition; Singer & 
Blagov, 2002). Participants were required to describe their memory using a minimum of 
500 words. This narrative was subsequently subjected to linguistic analysis using the 
dictionaries provided by LIWC, as described above.  
 In addition to the memory task, participants were also asked to self-report the 
phenomenological characteristics of their recollected memory using the Memory 
Experience Questionnaire (Sutin & Robins, 2007) and the Centrality of Events Scale 
(Berntsen & Rubin, 2006). Finally, participants were asked to provide demographic 
information. Each piece of the protocol will be described in greater detail below.  
2.1.3 Memory manipulation.  
An autobiographical memory manipulation was used to elicit self-defining and 
everyday memories (Singer & Blagov, 2002). This memory manipulation is based upon 
the memory manipulation originally used by Singer and Moffitt (1991-1992) to investigate 
memory specificity. The self-defining memory manipulation has been used in various 
memory studies over the years, ranging from developmental (McLean & Thorne, 2003; 
Thorne et al., 2004), clinical (Crane et al., 2010; Goddard, O’Dowda, & Pring, 2017; 
Nandrino & Gandolphe, 2017; Sutherland & Bryant, 2005), and cognitive research areas 
(Blagov & Singer, 2004; Liao, Bluck, & Westerhof, 2017; Moffitt & Singer, 1994).  
While research has primarily focused on self-defining memories, some studies have 
explored the complementary role of everyday memories. Thus, the everyday memory 
component of the autobiographical memory task has also been used to elicit everyday 
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memories as a comparison to self-defining memories (Crane et al., 2010; Goddard et al., 
2017; Singer & Moffitt, 1991-1992). These studies have found that self-defining memories 
were more likely to be summary memories (27% of recollected memories) compared to 
everyday memories (8% of recollected memories), reflecting a broader generalization to 
the life story for self-defining memories (Singer & Moffitt, 1991-1992). Furthermore, these 
self-defining memories were rated as more important to the memory sharer and contained 
more explicit references to self-discovery or self-understanding than everyday memories. 
A subsequent study found that healthy participants reported self-defining memories that 
were more emotionally intense, self-revealing, more well-remembered, more vivid, more 
important, and thought about more frequently than everyday memories (Crane et al., 2010; 
Goddard et al., 2017). This suggests that the self-defining and everyday memory prompts 
can elicit meaningfully different autobiographical memories.  
The autobiographical memory task was adapted for this study in two ways. First, 
the self-defining and everyday memory tasks were adapted to be identical in every respect 
except the attribute referring to “an enduring theme, issue or conflict from your life” (for 
the self-defining memory task) or a memory that is “personally experienced, i.e., not a 
memory that a parent or sibling described to you, nor something that you read about or 
heard about through the media” (for the everyday memory task). The original memory 
manipulations manipulated several memory dimensions at once, such as the importance, 
emotionality, and rehearsal of the recollected memory. As such, it is impossible to discern 
if the self-defining and everyday memories differ because of these ancillary manipulations, 
or if they differ meaningfully along their connection to enduring life concerns. Since the 
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connection to long-term life goals is definitional to a self-defining memory, this attribute 
was kept while the others while controlled in the adapted memory manipulation.  
Second, the self-defining and everyday memory manipulations were adapted to 
refer to work-related memories. This adaptation was included as this study is interested in 
how self-defining memories serve work-related processes. Therefore, self-defining and 
everyday memories about work were collected.  
The specific changes made for the self-defining and everyday memory 
manipulations are described in greater detail below.  
2.1.3.1 Self-defining memory task.  
In the Self-Defining Memory Task, participants were asked to describe a memory 
that fulfills the following prompt (Singer & Blagov, 2002):  
To understand best what a personal memory is, imagine you have just met 
someone you like very much and are going for a walk together. Each of you is very 
committed to helping the other get to know yourself. In the course of the conversation, 
you describe a work or professional memory that you feel conveys powerfully how you 
have come to be the worker/professional you currently are [emphasis added]. It is 
precisely this memory, which you tell the other person, that constitutes a personal 
memory.  
In addition to the prompt, a list of six attributes were also included to describe a 
self-defining memory. As discussed above, this memory task was adapted in two ways (see 
Appendix A for original and adapted task). First, the memory attributes were changed to 
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match the everyday memory attributes in every way except for the connection to “an 
enduring theme, issue, or conflict from your life” (see Appendix A, Attribute #1). These 
changes were made to experimentally manipulate only one piece of a self-defining memory 
– the connection to an enduring theme, issue, or conflict. The remaining attributes were 
made neutral to match the everyday memory manipulation (e.g., It is a memory that is 
either important or unimportant to you) to prevent the prompt from manipulating multiple 
memory dimensions at once. Second, the following attribute was added to address work-
relevant self-defining memories: “It is a memory about work. The memory does not need 
to have occurred at work, but it should be about work in some way” (see Appendix A, 
Attribute #6).  
2.1.3.2 Everyday memory task.  
Participants assigned to the everyday memory task, on the other hand, were asked 
to recall a generic memory. In this memory task, participants are asked to respond to the 
following prompt (see Appendix B):  
To understand best what a personal memory is, imagine you have just met 
someone you like very much and are going for a walk together. Each of you is very 
committed to helping the other get to know yourself. In the course of the conversation, 
you describe a work or professional memory that you personally experienced [emphasis 
added]. It is precisely this memory, which you tell the other person, that constitutes a 
personal memory. 
The italicized words in the prompt above highlight where the everyday memory 
prompt differs from the self-defining memory prompts. This prompt is an adaptation of the 
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self-defining memory prompt to make the two memory manipulations as similar as possible 
on every dimension except the connection to an enduring theme, issue, or concern (Singer 
& Blagov, 2002; see Appendix B for original and adapted task) . In addition to this memory 
prompt, participants are also given a list six attributes of everyday memories. All the 
attributes, included the added work attribute discussed above, were identical to the self-
defining memory prompt except for the attribute referring to a personal memory. 
Specifically, this attribute read “It is a memory that was personally experienced, i.e., not a 
memory that a parent or sibling described to you, nor something that you read about or 
heard about through the media” (see Appendix B, Attribute #1).  
 After picking their self-defining or everyday memory, all participants were asked 
to describe their memory narrative. Specifically, participants were asked to provide the 
following information:  
Please describe your work-related memory. In your description, please include a 
caption for the event, your age at the time of the event, whom you were with, what 
happened, and how you and any others present responded to the event. Please include 
details that would help an imagined friend see and feel as you did. 
2.1.4 Self-report measures.  
The following self-report measures were included in the study to determine if the 
memory manipulation was effective and assess the phenomenological memory 
characteristics: (a) manipulation check items, (b) the Memory Experiences Questionnaire 
(Sutin & Robins, 2007), and (c) the Centrality of Events Scale (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006). 
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Demographic information was also collected via self-report. The complete scales are 
included in Appendix C. 
2.1.4.1 Manipulation checks.  
Six single-item manipulation checks were included to ascertain that the self-
defining vs. everyday memory manipulation was eliciting appropriate memories from 
participants. These items asked participants to rate the extent to which the recalled memory 
(a) is an important memory to them, (b) represents the “real” them, (c) is thought about 
regularly, (d) describes an important theme from their life, (e) is an emotional memory 
about their life, and (f) reflects who they are as a person. While the dimensions of 
importance, emotionality, and rehearsal of the recollected memory were not experimentally 
manipulated in this study (see above for a discussion of adaptations to the autobiographical 
memory task), manipulation check items assessing these dimensions were included. This 
was used to ascertain if the adapted memory manipulation was still eliciting self-defining 
memories that are more important, emotional, and thought about more regularly than 
everyday memories.  
2.1.4.2 Memory Experiences Questionnaire.  
The phenomenological memory characteristics of autonoesis, sensory-perceptual 
detail, and emotionality were assessed using facets from the Memory Experience 
Questionnaire (MEQ, Sutin & Robins, 2007) . Currently, there are three scales that are 
commonly used to assess memory phenomenology: the Memory Characteristics 
Questionnaire (MCQ; M. K. Johnson et al., 1998), the Autobiographical Memory 
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Questionnaire (AMQ; Rubin, Schrauf, & Greenberg, 2003), and the Memory Experience 
Questionnaire (MEQ; Sutin & Robins, 2007).  
The MCQ is the classic memory phenomenology questionnaire, composed of 39 
items assessing constructs ranging from the amount of visual detail to relative spatial 
arrangement of objects in the memory (M. K. Johnson et al., 1988). The AMQ is a more 
recent measure of memory phenomenology that is composed of 19 items assessing 
constructs ranging from story coherence to memory distortion (Rubin et al., 2003). 
However, these scales suffer from several measurement limitations. First, the scale 
construction procedures for these measures were not guided by item or factor analysis, and 
the even subsequent studies have failed to report robust and replicable factors (Suengas & 
Johnson, 1988; Takahashi & Shimizu, 2007). Indeed, the interitem reliability for the MCQ 
scales, when reported, is below acceptable levels (Schaefer & Philippot, 2005). Second, 
the MCQ and AMQ scales rely on single-item measurements for some important constructs 
or simply do not assess other constructs of interest. For example, the MCQ does not have 
items addressing the visual perspective and the AMQ relies on a single item to address the 
emotionality of a recollected memory with no reference to the emotional valence. Finally, 
these scales do not contain any reverse-scored items. While not inherently a problem, the 
lack of reserve-scored items coupled with the online data collection lead to concerns about 
response sets or mindless responding from participants.  
The MEQ, in contrast, contains ten factor analyzed facets of memory 
phenomenology assessing the various dimensions with a minimum of five items (Luchetti 
& Sutin, 2016; Sutin & Robins, 2007). The facets exhibit acceptable interitem reliability 
(α > .70) and contain reverse-scored items, allowing for the detection of mindless 
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responding in participants. Furthermore, the MEQ has been related to individual 
differences in remembering and the type of memory recalled. Specifically, the MEQ has 
differentiated between individuals high/low on psychological distress and self-esteem and 
their subsequent memory phenomenology (Sutin & Gillath, 2009; Sutin & Robins, 2007). 
Perhaps more importantly, the MEQ can detect phenomenological differences based on the 
type of memory recalled. Specifically, past memories, near self memories, and memories 
with a first-person perspective were associated with stronger phenomenological 
characteristics than imagined future memories, memories about friends, and third-person 
perspective memories, respectively (Grysman, Prabhakar, Anglin, & Hudson, 2013; Sutin 
& Robins, 2010). Due to the demonstrated reliability and validity of this scale for capturing 
meaningful variability in memory phenomenology, the MEQ was used in this study.  
Autonoesis was assessed with seven items addressing visual perspective (e.g., “I 
see the experience in the memory through my own eyes”). Sensory-perceptual detail was 
assessed using eight items from the sensory detail subscale (e.g., “I can bodily ‘feel’ myself 
in this memory”). Emotionality was assessed using six items from the emotional intensity 
subscale (e.g., “The memory of this event evokes powerful emotions”). Participants were 
asked to rate the extent to which they agree with each item (1 – Strongly disagree, 5 – 
Strongly agree). In addition to the three facets of the MEQ addressed above, the remaining 
7 facets were also included in this study for exploratory analyses.  
2.1.4.3 Centrality of events scale.  
The phenomenological characteristic of self-centrality was assessed using the 
Centrality of Events Scale (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006). This 20-item scale assessed how 
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central an event is to a person’s life story (e.g., “This event has become a reference point 
for the way I understand myself and the world”). Participants were asked to rate the extent 
to which they agree with each item (1 – Strongly disagree, 5 – Strongly agree). This scale 
has a one-factor solution and demonstrates high reliability (α > .90; Berntsen & Rubin, 
2006). Traditionally, this scale has been used in conjunction with post-traumatic stress 
events, but it has also been used with normal populations assessing the relationship 
between positive and negative event memories and the subsequent centrality of the memory 
to the participant’s life story (Berntsen, Rubin, & Siegler, 2011; Boals, 2010; Pinto‐
Gouveia & Matos, 2011). Furthermore, the self-centrality of a memory has been related to 
the memory phenomenological characteristics, with highly self-central memories related 
to increased vividness and emotional intensity (Boals, 2010).  
2.1.4.4 Linguistic measures.  
Finally, the provided memories were subjected to linguistic analysis using the 
Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC, Pennebaker, Francis, & Booth, 2001) program. 
The LIWC program is a word count method that divides words into psychologically 
meaningful categories (Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010). The computer program is 
accompanied by a set of predefined dictionaries that assess style words (e.g., pronouns, 
prepositions, auxiliary verbs, etc.) and content words (e.g., nouns, verbs, adjectives, etc.). 
Style words reflect how people are communicating while content words reflect what they 
are saying. LIWC is a “probabilistic system” (Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010, p. 30), 
meaning it codes words according to their typical usage. For example, the phrase “I’m mad 
at him” and “He’s mad as a hatter” will both code “mad” as an anger word, ignoring the 
context of the phrase. However, this is a limitation of most linguistic analysis tools.  
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LIWC pre-defined dictionaries were used in this study. Specifically, the perceptual 
process dictionary contains words such as “look, heard, feeling” while the first-person 
pronoun dictionary contains words such as “I, me, mine” (Pennebaker, Boyd, et al., 2015). 
The summary variables of authentic language and emotional tone are proprietary variables 
that are not accompanied by open dictionaries. These variables are derived from published 
findings (Cohn, Mehl, & Pennebaker, 2004; Newman, Pennebaker, Berry, & Richards, 
2003). These summary variables represent percentile rank scores of authenticity and 
emotional tone based on large comparison samples.  
In addition to the hypothesized linguistic variables described above, the remaining 
style and content linguistic variables were also calculated through the LIWC program for 
exploratory analyses. Examples of words from the requisite dictionaries can be found in 
the LIWC manual (Pennebaker, Boyd, et al., 2015).  
2.2 Study 2: Hearing Self-Defining Memories 
This study addresses the experience of the memory listener in the memory sharing 
process. Specifically, this study investigates how the type of memory (self-defining vs. 
everyday memory) and the immersion of the memory (high immersion vs. low immersion) 
influences the efficacy of the shared memory for affective and informational outcomes. 
Specifically, shared self-defining memories are thought to elicit stronger affective 
connections of (H9) likability, (H10) affective trust, and (H11) empathy for the memory 
sharer the everyday memories. Similarly, shared self-defining memories are thought to 
elicit stronger informational connections of (H12) perceived work meaningfulness, (H13) 
insight, and (H14) cognitive trust with the memory sharer than everyday memories. Finally, 
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the relationship between memory type and informational and affective outcomes is 
hypothesized to be moderated by memory immersion. Specifically, self-defining memories 
that are characterized by strong phenomenological memory characteristics (e.g., high 
sensory-perceptual detail, emotionality, autonoesis, and self-centrality) are thought to be 
more efficacious conveyors of information, leading to higher ratings of (H15a) likability, 
(H15b) affective trust, (H15c) empathy, (H15d) perceived work meaningfulness, (H15e) 
insight, and (H15f) cognitive trust. In this study, I will focus on the experience of the 
memory listener and explore how shared memories, and their associated phenomenology, 
inform affective and informational work outcomes.  
To address these hypotheses, four representative vignettes were selected from 
Study 1 to manipulate memory type (self-defining vs. everyday memory) and memory 
immersion (high vs. low). Participants recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk were 
randomly assigned to one of the four conditions and asked to read the assigned vignette. 
Specifically, participants were given the following instructions:  
This part of the experiment involves the sharing of a personal memory. On the next 
page, you will be asked to read a real memory shared by a real individual. Please read this 
memory carefully, and imagine this person is a coworker telling you a story about their 
work.  
After reading this personal memory, you will be asked a series of questions about 
the memory and the person sharing the memory. 
Following the reading task, participants were asked to rate the perceived 
phenomenology of the memory for the memory sharer and rate the imagined memory 
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sharer along the affective and informational dimensions. Finally, participants were asked 
to respond to an open-ended question asking them to describe the memory they read and 
provide demographic information.  
2.2.1 Participants.  
Responses from a total of 119 participants were collected from Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk. Responses from six participants were discarded for failing attention 
checks or being unable to describe the shared memory, resulting in a sample size of 113 
participants. Participants were full-time employees (working 30+ hours per week) living 
in the United States. The sample is 50% male with a mean age of 37.0 years (SD = 10.20 
years) and a mean job tenure of 6.84 years (SD = 5.72 years). The sample overwhelming 
identified as white/Caucasian (77.9%) and reported an average household income of 
$40,000 - $49,999. All but one respondent reported a high school or an equivalent, with 
45% of participants reporting a bachelor degree and 22% of participants reporting some 
college, but no degree. 
2.2.2 Protocol.  
Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions: self-defining 
memory – high immersion, self-defining memory – low immersion, everyday memory – 
high immersion, everyday memory – low immersion. Participants were asked to read a de-
identified memory that was shared in Study 1, rate the memory for its phenomenological 
characteristics, and evaluate the imagined memory sharer for their perceived affective 
connection (i.e., likability, affective trust, empathy) and information connection (i.e., 
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meaning, insight, cognitive trust). Finally, participants self-reported demographic 
information.  
2.2.3 Vignettes.  
The goal of vignette selection was to select self-defining and everyday memories 
that were shared using language reflecting high or low memory immersion. To that end, 
vignettes were selected from Study 1 based on (a) their inclusion in the self-defining or 
everyday memory elicitation manipulation and (b) a combination of their linguistic 
characteristics. As this study is focused on the experience of the memory listener, the 
vignettes were chosen based on the linguistic characteristics of the vignette instead of the 
self-reported phenomenological characteristics of the memory sharer. While it was 
hypothesized in Study 1 that perceived phenomenology would influence linguistic 
characteristics, these hypotheses were largely unsupported. While it is possible that the 
phenomenal characteristics were communicated using linguistic strategies I did not assess, 
the vignettes were selected based on linguistic characteristics that would be communicated 
to the memory sharer instead of self-reported phenomenology that may or may not be 
communicated. Specifically, memories were chosen based on their linguistic achievement, 
affect, visual perceptual processes, and first-person singular pronouns.  
The linguistic property of achievement was chosen because it positively related to 
the phenomenological characteristic of self-centrality. Memories that were rated as more 
central to the sharer’s sense of self were shared using more achievement words (b = .29, t 
= 2.65, p < .01). Therefore, high immersion memories were selected that were in the upper 
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quartile of achievement words and low immersion memories were selected from the lower 
quartile of achievement words.  
The remaining phenomenological characteristics of emotional intensity, sensory-
perceptual detail, and autonoesis were not related to any interpretable linguistic strategies. 
This may be due, at least in part, to the psychometric difficulties associated with the 
assessment of these characteristics. Therefore, the linguistic strategies of affect words, 
visual perceptual process words, and first-person singular pronouns were chosen to 
approximate the communication of these phenomenological characteristics through 
language. The selected high/low immersion vignettes are, on average, two standard 
deviations apart on linguistic affect words, 1 standard deviation apart on first-person 
singular pronouns, and .75 standard deviations apart on visual perceptual process words. 
The high immersion memories contain more affect words, first-person singular pronouns, 
and visual perceptual process words than low immersion memories. The selected vignettes 
are in Appendix D.  
2.2.4 Self-report measures.  
The following measures were included to assess affective and informational 
outcomes and perceived memory phenomenology: (a) manipulation checks, (b) likability, 
(c) affective trust, (d) empathy, (e) work meaningfulness, (f) insight, (g) cognitive trust, (h) 
Memory Experiences Questionnaire (Sutin & Robins, 2007), (i) Centrality of Events Scale 
(Berntsen & Rubin, 2006), and (j) likelihood of sharing a memory with the memory sharer. 
All the measures were adapted in various ways to refer to the imagined memory sharer. 
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Specific information on the memories, and how they were adapted, is included below. The 
complete scales are included in Appendix E. 
2.2.4.1 Manipulation checks.  
Participants were asked to respond to six manipulation check items to ascertain if 
the memory manipulation was eliciting the appropriate types of memory. These 
manipulation check items were adapted from Study 1 to refer to the imagined memory 
sharer. Specifically, these items address (a) an important memory for the sharer, (b) 
representative of the “real me” for the sharer, (c) thought about regularly by the sharer, (d) 
describing an important theme for the sharer, (e) an emotional memory for the sharer, and 
(f) reflective of the memory sharer as a person.  
2.2.4.2 Likability.  
Likability was assessed with eight items from the Reysen Likability Scale (Reysen, 
2005). Three items were discarded as they were not relevant to this study. Specifically, one 
item was discarded because it addresses similarity and one item was discarded because it 
addresses roommates. A final item was discarded as it addressed physical attraction. A 
sample item is “This person is likable.” This scale exhibits accepted inter-item reliability 
and shows appropriate convergent and discriminant validity (Reysen, 2005). Participants 
are asked to rate how strongly they agree with each statement (1 –Strongly disagree, 5 – 
Strongly agree). 
2.2.4.3 Affective trust. 
 54
Listeners’ affective trust of the memory sharer was assessed with five items from 
an interpersonal trust measure assessing affect-based trust (McAllister, 1995). Items were 
adapted to refer to the memory sharer instead of a specific coworker. An example item is 
“I believe I would be able to talk freely to this individual about difficulties I am having at 
work and know that (s)he will want to listen.” The scale exhibits appropriate interitem 
reliability and is related to peer interaction frequency and citizenship behavior, indicating 
appropriate convergent validity (McAllister, 1995). Participants were asked to indicate the 
extent to which they agree with the statements regarding their imagined coworker (1 – Very 
strongly disagree, 7 – Very strongly agree). 
2.2.4.4 Empathy.  
Empathy was assessed with a list of five adjectives. Participants were asked to 
report how sympathetic, warm, compassionate, soft-hearted, and tender they feel towards 
their imagined coworker (1 – Not at all, 5 – Extremely). This empathy index has been used 
in previous interpersonal studies of empathy (Batson, 1987; Batson, Klein, Highberger, & 
Shaw, 1995; DeWall & Baumeister, 2006). The five adjectives have acceptable interitem 
reliability and have been related to social exclusion (DeWall & Baumeister, 2006).  
2.2.4.5 Meaningfulness.  
Meaningfulness was assessed using 10 items from two measures of work 
meaningfulness (Bunderson & Thompson, 2009; May, Gilson, & Harter, 2004). The items 
were adapted to refer to the perceived work meaningfulness of the memory sharer. The two 
scales were combined they appear to be tapping in to different but related aspects of the 
work meaningfulness construct (e.g., work meaningfulness as it relates to the individual 
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and work meaningfulness as it relates to the broader societal context). One item was 
discarded because it was essentially the same across both scales. The scales exhibit 
appropriate interitem reliability and are related to occupational identification, job 
enrichment, and work role fit (Bunderson & Thompson, 2009; May et al., 2004). An 
example item is “The work this person does on this job is worthwhile.” Participants were 
asked to rate the extent to which they agree with each statement (1 – Very strongly disagree, 
7 – Very strongly agree). 
2.2.4.6 Insight.  
Perceived insight was assessed using items developed from definitions of insights 
within autobiographical learning (McLean & Thorne, 2001; McLean & Thorne, 2003; 
Thorne et al., 2004). As described above, insight refers to learning that extends beyond the 
immediate event and to experience broadly. I developed five questions that ask participants 
to rate the perceived insightfulness of the memory sharer. An example item is “My 
coworker knows ‘life lessons’ that can apply to life broadly.” Participants were asked to 
rate the extent to which they agree with each statement (1 – Very strongly disagree, 7 – 
Very strongly agree). 
2.2.4.7 Cognitive trust.  
Listeners’ cognitive trust of the memory sharer was assessed with six items from 
an interpersonal trust measure assessing cognitive-based trust (McAllister, 1995). Items 
were adapted to refer to the memory sharer instead of a specific coworker. An example 
item is “I believe this person approaches his/her job with professionalism and dedication.” 
The scale exhibits appropriate interitem reliability and is related to improved decision 
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outcomes (McAllister, 1995; Parayitam & Dooley, 2009). Participants were asked to 
indicate the extent to which they agree with the statements regarding their imagined 
coworker (1 – Strongly disagree, 5 – Strongly agree). 
2.2.4.8 Memory Experiences Questionnaire.  
The Memory Experiences Questionnaire (Sutin & Robins, 2007) was used again to 
assess the perceived memory phenomenology for the memory sharer. Specifically, the 
memory listener was asked to rate how vivid, emotional, etc. the shared memory was for 
the memory sharer. While the MEQ exhibited psychometric issues in Study 1 associated 
with ceiling effects, this measure was kept for Study 2 (a) to maintain consistency across 
studies and (b) because an acceptable alternative does not exist. Once again, all 10 facets 
of the MEQ were included in this study, and the items were adapted to refer to the memory 
sharer’s experience instead of “my” experience. A sample item is “This person’s memory 
for this event is clear.” Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they agree 
with the statements regarding their imagined coworker (1 – Strongly disagree, 5 – Strongly 
agree). 
2.2.4.9 Centrality of Events Scale.  
The Centrality of Events Scale (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006) was used to assess the 
perceived self-centrality of the shared memory for the memory sharer. The items were 
adapted to refer to the memory sharer’s experience instead of “my” experience. A sample 
item is “This event tells a lot about who this person is.” Participants were asked to indicate 
the extent to which they agree with the statements regarding their imagined coworker (1 – 
Strongly disagree, 5 – Strongly agree).  
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CHAPTER 3. RESULTS 
The following analyses will address the experiences of the memory sharer and the 
memory listener. Study 1 addresses the recall of a self-defining or everyday memory, its 
associated phenomenological characteristics, and the language used to describe and share 
that memory. Study 2 extends the memory sharing process to the memory listener and 
explores how shared memories are used to inform interpersonal affective and informational 
outcomes, and how the phenomenological characteristics of the memory influence the 
strength of that relationship. 
3.1 Study 1: Memory Sharer Results 
The first piece of the memory sharing process addresses the memory experience of 
the memory sharer for the recollection if a self-defining or everyday memory, the 
phenomenological characteristics of the memory, and the language used to describe and 
share the memory with others. Prior to investigating the hypotheses, it is first important to 
ascertain that the memory manipulation is working correctly. Therefore, a multivariate 
analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted to explore the effect of the memory 
manipulation on the extent to which the memory was rated as (a) important, (b) 
representing the “real” me, (c) thought about regularly, (d) describing an important theme 
form my life, (e) emotional, and (f) reflecting who I am as a person. The multivariate test 
revealed a significant effect of memory type on the manipulation check items, F(6, 150) = 
4.38, Pillai’s Trace = .15, p < .01, therefore post-hoc univariate tests were conducted.  
A Holm-Bonferroni correction was used to set target alpha levels for the multiple 
comparisons (Holland & Copenhaver, 1988; Holm, 1979). A Holm-Bonferroni, compared 
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to a traditional Bonferroni correction, changes the target alpha level for each additional 
test. This approach appropriately constrains Type I error rates while providing sufficient 
power to detect meaningful effects. The univariate tests revealed a significant effect of 
memory type across all six manipulation check items (see Table 1). Specifically, self-
defining memories were rated as more (a) important, (b) representing the “real” me, (c) 
thought about regularly, (d) describing an important theme form my life, (e) emotional, 
and (f) reflecting who I am as a person than everyday memories. These analyses suggest 
that the memory manipulation could elicit self-defining and everyday memories (see Figure 
5).
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Manipulation Check Item M SD  M SD F P-value 
Target 
alpha 
1. To what extent does this memory reflect who you are as a person? 3.15 1.11  3.94 1.00 21.57 0.000* 0.008 
2. This memory describes an important theme from my life. 3.37 1.31  4.11 1.03 15.64 0.000* 0.010 
3. This is an emotional memory about my life. 3.47 1.24  4.05 1.00 10.35 0.002* 0.013 
4. This memory is an important memory for me. 3.90 1.10  4.35 0.08 9.12 0.003* 0.017 
5. This memory represents the “real” me. 3.65 1.24  4.09 1.02 5.81 0.017* 0.025 
6. I think about this memory regularly. 3.18 1.25  3.59 1.20 4.52 0.035* 0.050 




Figure 5 - Effect of memory type on manipulation check items for the memory sharer.
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 The following analyses are divided into four parts. First, I will explore the 
relationship between memory type (self-defining vs. everyday memory) and 
phenomenological memory characteristics. Second, I will address the relationship between 
memory phenomenology and the linguistic strategies used to share those memories. Third, 
I will provide an overview of a path model of memory sharing that addresses memory type, 
memory phenomenology, and linguistic strategies. Finally, I will cover additional 
exploratory analyses not explicitly addressed in the hypotheses. Each of these sections will 
be addressed in detail below. For the following analyses, outliers were discarded in a 
pairwise fashion. Outliers were defined as responses 1.5 times the interquartile range 
below/above the first/third quartile (Tukey, 1977). This interquartile method was used as 
it is more robust to extreme scores than the traditional standard deviation approach.  
3.1.1 Phenomenological characteristics of self-defining and everyday memories.  
After ascertaining that the memory manipulation was eliciting appropriate 
memories from the participants, additional analyses were conducted to investigate memory 
phenomenology (see Table 2 for descriptive and correlational statistics). However, an 
inspection of the distributions reveals severe ceiling effects for the MEQ facets of sensory-
perceptual detail, emotionality, and autonoesis (see Figure 6). This lack of normality is 
concerning and potentially limits the generalizability of the results. Despite these ceiling 
effects, the following analyses were conducted to test for the hypothesized effects of 
memory type on memory phenomenology. 
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Table 2 - Descriptive and correlational statistics for memory sharer phenomenological memory characteristics. 
 n M SD α 1. 2. 3. 4. 
Memory Type 157 .50 .50 -- --    
Sensory-perceptual detail 156 4.11 .63 .78 -.01 --   
Emotionality 156 4.30 .71 .87 .15 .68** --  
Autonoesis 157 4.14 .81 .82 -.09 .34** .25** -- 
Self-centrality 153 4.54 1.28 .95 .38** .20* .37** -.07 
* p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Figure 6 - Distribution of responses for phenomenological sensory-perceptual detail, 
emotionality, autonoesis, and self-centrality. 
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Specifically, a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted to 
investigate if self-defining memories, compared to everyday memories, are characterized 
by (H1) more sensory-perceptual detail, (H2) more emotionality, (H3) stronger autonoesis, 
and (H4) more self-centrality. The MANOVA results indicate a significant difference in 
phenomenological characteristics for self-defining and everyday memories, F(4, 147) = 
7.32, Pillai’s Trace = .17, p < .01.  
Planned post-hoc comparisons were conducted to further investigate the role of 
memory type on specific phenomenological characteristics. A significant difference 
between self-defining and everyday memories was not found for sensory-perceptual detail, 
F(1, 150) = 0.00, p = .99, emotionality, F(1, 150) = 3.21, p = .08, or autonoesis, F(1, 150) 
= 1.17, p = .28. A significant effect of memory type was found for self-centrality, such that 
self-defining memories were rated as being more central to their sense of self than everyday 
memories, F(1, 150) = 27.12, p < .01. The univariate results and group means are presented 
in Table 3. These results indicate that self-defining memories are perceived as more central 
to the sharer’s sense of self than everyday memories (H4, supported), but do not differ 
along the phenomenological characteristics of sensory-perceptual detail (H1, not 
supported), emotionality (H2, not supported), or autonoesis (H3, not supported). 
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Table 3 - Univariate tests of memory sharer phenomenological characteristics and memory type. 
 Everyday 
Memory 





M SD  M SD F Hypothesis 
Sensory-perceptual 4.11 0.68  4.11 0.58 0.00 H1 
Emotionality 4.19 0.78  4.40 0.63 3.21t H2 
Autonoesis 4.21 0.81  4.07 0.80 1.17 H3 
Self-centrality 4.06 1.29  5.04 1.06 27.12** H4 
t < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01 
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3.1.2 Linguistic strategies and phenomenological characteristics.  
After investigating the phenomenological characteristics of recalled memories, a 
series of analyses were conducted to explore the linguistic strategies used in the sharing of 
these memories. Prior to investigating the hypotheses, a MANOVA was conducted to 
determine if self-defining and everyday memories were shared using similar control 
language metrics. Specifically, a MANOVA was conducted to determine if self-defining 
and everyday memories were shared using similar (a) number of words, (b) words per 
sentence, (c) words greater than six letters, and (d) dictionary words. A significant effect 
of memory type was not found on these language metrics, Pillai’s Trace = 0.04, F(4, 152) 
= 1.55, p = .19 (see Table 4 for group means). This suggests that self-defining and everyday 
memories were not shared using different language metrics, providing initial evidence that 
these memories are not substantially different along irrelevant dimensions, such as the 
number of words used to describe the memory. This suggests that any differences in 
linguistic strategies are likely due to the type of memory being recalled, not unrelated 
language dimensions. 
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Table 4 - Univariate tests of memory sharer control linguistic characteristics across 
memory type. 




M SD  M SD 
Word count 598.06 107.51  590.89 114.08 
Words per sentence 20.57 6.26  21.87 9.76 
Words greater than six 
letters 
15.75 3.34  16.77 4.28 





 A series of linear regressions were used to determine if phenomenological memory 
characteristics were shared using specific linguistic strategies (see Table 5for descriptive 
and correlation statistics). Specifically, regressions were used to determine if high sensory-
perceptual detail was shared using more perceptual process words (H5), high emotionality 
was shared using more emotional tone words (H6), high autonoesis was shared using more 
personal pronouns (H7), and high self-centrality was shared with more authentic tone (H8). 
A significant effect of memory phenomenology on linguistic characteristics was not found 
for any of the hypothesized relationships (see Table 6). Phenomenological sensory-
perceptual detail was unrelated to perceptual process words (H5, not supported), 
emotionality was not related to emotional tone words (H6, not supported), autonoesis was 
not related to personal pronouns (H7, not supported), and self-centrality was not related to 
authentic tone words (H8, not supported). 
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Table 5 - Descriptive and correlational statistics for memory sharer linguistic characteristics. 
  n M SD 1 2 3 4 
1. Memory Type 157 0.50 0.50 --    
2. Perceptual process words 156 2.09 1.02 0 --   
3. Emotional tone words a 157 21.3 12.94 0.03 0.1 --  
4. First-person singular 
pronouns 
157 7.39 3.08 0.16* 0.15 0.13 -- 
4. Authentic tone 156 70.44 22.63 0.04 -0.03 0.04 0.62** 
a Emotional tone variable is transformed so that 0 represents a neutral tone and 50 represents 
a more emotional tone 




Table 6 - Linear regressions for memory sharer linguistic strategies. 
 Model 1: Perceptual 
process words 
 Model 2: 
Emotional tone a 
 Model 3: First-
person singular 
pronouns 




b SE t  b SE t  b SE t  b SE t 
Sensory-perceptual detail .18 13 1.35             
Emotional tone     .89 1.45 .61         
Autonoesis         -.13 .31 .66     
Self-centrality             2.38 1.42 1.68 





3.1.3 Path model of memory sharing.  
In addition to the analyses described above, a path analysis was conducted to 
investigate the role of memory type, phenomenological memory characteristics, and 
linguistic strategies in one complete model. This allows for a test of a general model fit 
instead of exploring each relationship separately. Furthermore, a path model allows for the 
carrying through of variance from memory type through phenomenological characteristics 
to linguistic strategies, allowing for a more precise test of these mediating mechanisms. 
 An initial model was tested exploring the effect of memory type through 
phenomenological memory characteristics to linguistic strategies (see Figure 7). This 
model exhibited very poor model fit, χ2 (22, 149) = 161.56, p < .001, CFI = .39, RMSEA 
= .21. An investigation of modification indices suggests that correlating error terms among 
the phenomenological characteristics would improve model fit. Therefore, a second model 
was examined with correlated error terms (see Figure 8). This model exhibited greatly 
improved fit, χ2 (16, 149) = 26.41, p = .05, CFI = .96, RMSEA = .07. At risk of overfitting 
the model, analyses were halted at this point. 
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Figure 7 - Initial path analysis for memory type, phenomenological characteristics, and linguistic strategies. χ2 (22, 149) = 161.56, 
p < .001, CFI = .39, RMSEA = .21 
Recalled Memory  
0 = Everyday Memory 

















Figure 8 - Final path analysis for memory type, phenomenological characteristics, and linguistic strategies with correlated 
error terms. χ2 (16, 149) = 26.41, p = .05, CFI = .96, RMSEA = .07
Recalled Memory  
0 = Everyday Memory 

















 As the second model exhibited moderate fit, the path coefficients in this model were 
examined. The results from the path analysis largely mirror the results described above in 
the separated analyses. Memory type (self-defining vs. everyday memories) was unrelated 
to sensory-perceptual detail (H1, not supported), emotion (H2, not supported), and 
autonoesis (H3, not supported). Memory type was significantly related to self-centrality 
(H4, supported). The variance from phenomenological characteristics did not carry through 
to linguistic strategies. Sensory-perceptual detail was unrelated to perceptual process 
words (H5, not supported), phenomenological emotion was unrelated to emotional tone 
(H6, not supported), autonoesis was unrelated to first-person singular pronouns (H7, not 
supported), and self-centrality was unrelated to authentic language (H8, not supported).  
These results do not support the proposed model of memory type (self-defining vs. 
everyday memories) leading to reliable phenomenological memory characteristics that are 
conveyed to others through reliable linguistic strategies. Self-centrality is the only 
phenomenological characteristic that is reliably related to memory type, and the linguistic 
strategies were largely unrelated to their hypothesized phenomenological memory 
characteristics. In the following section, I will branch out beyond the hypothesized 
relationships discussed above and conduct exploratory analyses to investigate 
phenomenological and linguistic strategies more broadly.  
3.1.4 Exploratory analyses.  
Additional analyses were conducted to explore the phenomenological and linguistic 
differences among self-defining and everyday memories that were not accompanied by 
specific hypotheses. For the following analyses, MANOVAs and, where permitted, post-
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hoc univariate comparisons were conducted. Target alpha levels for the post-hoc univariate 
comparisons were calculated using the Holm-Bonferroni method (Holland & Copenhaver, 
1988; Holm, 1979).  
 As a first step, additional analyses were conducted among the subscales for the 
Memory Experience Questionnaire (MEQ; Sutin & Robins, 2007) . The MEQ contains 
subscales that address memory (1) vividness, (2) coherence, (3) accessibility, (4) time 
perspective, (5) sharing, (6) distancing, and (7) valence in addition to the hypothesized 
subscales of (8) sensory detail, (9) visual perspective or autonoesis, and (10) emotional 
intensity (see Table 7 for descriptive and correlation statistics). An inspection of the 
distribution of responses reveals strong ceiling effects for many of the subscales of the 
MEQ (see Figure 9). While it is possible that all participants recollected their memories 
with exceptionally strong vividness, coherence, emotionality, etc., it also seems plausible 
that the scale was unable to capture meaningful variation in memory phenomenology. 
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Table 7 - Descriptive and correlation statistics for Memory Experience Questionnaire subscales. 
 1 M SD α 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 
1. Vividness 157 4.71 0.40 0.84 --         
2. Coherence 157 4.57 0.46 0.80 0.54** --        




4.11 0.63 0.78 0.58** 0.54** 0.45** --      
5. Emotional intensity 156 4.30 0.71 0.87 0.55** 0.32** 0.36** 0.68** --     
6. Visual perspective 157 4.14 0.81 0.82 0.26** 0.30** 0.34** 0.34** 0.25** --    
7. Time perspective 157 4.09 0.90 0.84 0.40** 0.33** 0.34** 0.50** 0.38** 0.06 --   
8. Sharing 157 3.39 1.16 0.93 0.38** 0.22** 0.29** 0.39** 0.42** 0.06 0.28** --  
9. Distancing 157 2.14 0.96 0.86 -0.19* -0.26** -0.23** -0.33** -0.24** -0.16* -0.25** -0.20* -- 
10. Valence 157 3.12 1.51 0.97 0.02 -0.15 0.04 0.04 -0.04 -0.07 0.07 0.18* -0.19* 
* p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Figure 9 - Distribution of responses for the Memory Experience Questionnaire (Sutin & Robins, 2007) phenomenological 
memory facets.
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Despite these ceiling effects, a MANOVA was conducted to determine if any 
phenomenological differences exist between self-defining and everyday memories. The 
phenomenological characteristics of sensory detail, visual perspective, and emotional 
intensity were not included in these analyses as they were already tested above. An 
omnibus F-test revealed no significant difference in memory phenomenology between self-
defining and everyday memories, F(7, 139) = 1.23, Pillai’s Trace = .06, p = .29. This 
suggests that self-defining and everyday memories do not differ along their self-reported 
phenomenological characteristics.  
In addition to the phenomenological characteristics, exploratory analyses were also 
conducted for the linguistic strategies individuals used to describe and share their memories 
(see Table 8). The analyses were conducted in iterations that grouped similar linguistic 
dimensions together for multivariate analysis. While some differences are expected 
between self-defining and everyday memories from some of these linguistic groupings, 
other groupings should not differ between memory types. Specifically, group differences 
are expected for (a) summary variables, (b) personal pronoun usage, (c) affective processes, 
(d) cognitive processes, (e) perceptual processes, (f) drives, and (g) personal concerns. 
Each of these groupings will be discussed in detail below. 
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Table 8 - Descriptive statistic for linguistic dimensions. 
  n M SD    n M SD 
Summary variables     Drives    
 Analytic thinking 157 58.47 19.16   Affiliation 153 2.07 1.45 
 Clout 155 45.14 20.54   Achievement 152 2.29 0.96 
 Authentic language 156 70.44 22.63   Power 152 2.97 1.18 
 Emotional tone 157 21.30 12.94   Reward 156 1.53 0.68 
Personal pronouns      Risk 152 0.49 0.37 
 I 157 7.39 3.08  Personal concerns   
 We 150 0.95 1.03   Work 157 5.41 2.30 
 You 145 0.19 0.30   Leisure 149 0.73 0.64 
 She/he 156 1.93 1.95   Home 152 0.44 0.44 
 They 153 0.74 0.58   Money 157 0.96 1.18 
Affect          
 Positive emotion 153 2.50 1.03       
 Negative emotion 154 1.50 0.78       
Social processes          
 Social 156 8.86 3.37     
 Family 146 0.22 0.32       
 Friend 149 0.19 0.24       
Cognitive processes          
 Insight 156 2.36 0.92       
 Cause 154 1.49 0.64       
 Discrepancy 157 1.72 0.85       
 Tentative 156 2.10 0.81       
 Certainty 153 1.62 0.71       
 Differentiation 153 2.59 0.90       
Perceptual processes 156 2.09 1.02       
 See 154 0.63 0.45       
 Hear 154 0.59 0.52       




For the linguistic groupings with an expected relationship, a series of MANOVAs 
reveal group differences in memory type for the LIWC (a) summary variables, (b) personal 
pronouns, (c) affective processes, (d) cognitive processes, (e) perceptual processes, (f) and 
drives (see Table 9 for MANOVA results). A significant MANOVA was not found for 
personal concerns. Univariate post-hoc tests with Holm-Bonferroni alpha corrections 
revealed significant group differences for the following linguistic dimensions: clout, first-
person plural pronouns (e.g., we), second person pronouns (e.g., you), positive emotion, 
causal cognitive processes, visual perceptual processes, and achievement and power drives 
(see Table 10). Self-defining memories are higher than everyday memories on the linguistic 
properties of second person pronouns, positive emotion, causal cognitive processes, 
achievement drives, and power drives. Self-defining memories are lower on the linguistic 
properties of clout, first-person plural pronouns, and visual perceptual processes (see 
Figure 10). 
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Table 9 - MANOVA results for memory sharer linguistic strategies. 
 Numerator 
df 
Denominator df F-value Pillai’s 
Trace 
p 
Summary variables 4 149 2.75 .07 .03* 
Personal pronouns 5 128 8.06 .24 .000** 
Affective processes 2 147 3.34 .04 .038* 
Cognitive processes 6 137 3.11 .12 .007** 
Perceptual processes 3 144 3.85 .07 .011* 
Drives 5 133 4.79 .15 .000** 
Personal concerns 4 139 1.81 .05 .131 
* p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 10 - Univariate tests of LIWC variables with expected differences. 




   




Summary variables         
 Analytic thinking 61.01 18.11  55.97 19.95 2.74 0.100 0.017 
 Clout 49.96 20.75  40.25 19.25 9.11 0.003* 0.013 
 
Authentic 
language 69.46 24.05  71.40 21.27 
0.28 0.60 .025 
 Emotional tone 20.91 11.99  21.69 13.87 0.14 0.71 .050 
Personal pronouns         
 I 6.89 2.93  7.89 3.17 4.22 .04 0.017 
 We 1.30 1.22  0.57 0.56 21.52 0.000* 0.010 
 You 0.10 0.17  0.27 0.36 13.59 0.000* 0.013 
 She/he 2.13 2.13  1.72 1.73 1.69 0.196 0.025 
 They 0.71 0.55  0.77 0.61 0.30 0.585 0.050 
Affect         
 Positive emotion 2.31 1.00  2.70 1.02 5.69 0.018* 0.025 
 Negative emotion 1.49 0.77  1.52 0.80 0.07 0.793 0.050 
Cognitive processes         
 Insight 2.27 0.93  2.46 0.91 1.63 0.204 0.050 
 Cause 1.35 0.56  1.62 0.68 7.42 0.007* 0.008 
 Discrepancy 1.59 0.79  1.85 0.90 3.63 0.059 0.017 
 Tentative 2.00 0.74  2.21 0.87 2.73 0.100 0.025 
 Certainty 1.48 0.72  1.75 0.67 5.81 0.017 0.010 
 Differentiate 2.42 0.80  2.75 0.98 5.16 0.025 0.025 
Perceptual processes         
 See 0.74 0.50  0.52 0.37 9.33 0.003* 0.017 
 Hear 0.56 0.48  0.62 0.55 0.55 0.460 0.050 
 Feel 0.57 0.43  0.68 0.50 2.16 0.144 0.025 
Drives         
 Affiliation 2.31 1.66  1.83 1.14 4.30 0.040 0.017 
 Achievement 2.03 0.85  2.54 0.99 11.66 0.001* 0.010 
 Power 2.69 0.85  3.23 1.37 8.44 0.004* 0.013 
 Reward 1.48 0.75  1.58 0.62 0.74 0.391 0.050 
  Risk 0.44 0.32  0.53 0.40 2.61 0.108 0.025 
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Figure 10 - Effect of memory type on linguistic characteristics of the shared memories.
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The exploratory analyses indicate that while self-defining and everyday memories 
are not differentiated by self-reported phenomenological characteristics, they are shared 
using distinct linguistic strategies. In the next section, I will discuss how these findings 
inform our understanding of the memory sharer’s experiences and how they may influence 
the perceptions of the memory listener.  
3.1.5 Summary of results for the memory sharer.  
Overall the hypotheses for Study 1 were not supported. Self-defining memories 
were not related to increased phenomenological sensory-perceptual detail, emotionality, or 
autonoesis, although self-defining memories were rated as more central to the sharer’s 
sense of self than everyday memories. The severe ceiling effects of the phenomenological 
memory scales are concerning, suggesting that there may be an issue with the sample, 
memory manipulation, or measurement of these constructs. The significant effect 
associated with self-centrality is also not particularly novel as self-centrality is a 
definitional part of self-defining memories. Furthermore, phenomenological characteristics 
did not influence the languages used to share the self-defining and everyday memories. 
This suggests that memory phenomenology may not be communicated from the sharer to 
the listener through language, or at least through the style and content of words used.  
Despite the lack of hypothesized effects, exploratory analyses indicate that self-
defining memories are shared using distinct linguistic strategies compared to everyday 
memories. These specific strategies, and the associated interpretations, will be reviewed in 
detail in the discussion section.  
3.2 Study 2: Memory Listener Results 
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The second piece of the memory sharing process addresses the memory listener. 
Specifically, this piece explores how self-defining and everyday memories influence the 
development of affective and informational work outcomes, and if memory characteristics 
moderate the strength of this relationship. Prior to hypothesis testing, the manipulation 
checks were first assessed to determine if self-defining (compared to everyday) memories 
and high immersion (compared to low immersion) memories were perceived differently by 
the memory listeners. A MANOVA revealed a significant main effect of memory type, 
F(6, 104) = 3.27, Pillai’s trace = .16, p < .01, and a significant main effect of memory 
immersion, F(6, 104) = 4.66, Pillai’s trace = .21, p < .01. A significant interaction was not 
found between memory type and memory immersion, F(6, 104) = .56, Pillai’s trace = .03, 
p = .76, so the interaction term was excluded in subsequent univariate tests. The univariate 
tests revealed, after Holm-Bonferroni correction, a significant effect of memory type such 
that self-defining memories (compared to everyday memories) were rated as (a) more 
emotional, (b) more important, and (c) shared more regularly. A significant main effect for 
memory immersion was also found, such that high immersion memories (compared to low 
immersion memories) were rated as (b) more reflective of who the memory sharer is as a 
person, (b) more emotional, and (c) more important. See Table 11 for a summary of the 
univariate tests and Figure 11 for a depiction of the univariate effects. 
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Table 11 - Univariate tests of memory listener manipulation check items 
  Memory Type   Memory Immersion 
Manipulation Check Item F alpha 
Target 
alpha  F alpha 
Target 
alpha 
To what extent does the shared memory reflect who this person is? 0.36 0.548 --   13.12 .000* 0.005 
The shared memory describes an important theme from this person's 
life. 4.97 .028 --  5.55 .020 -- 
The shared memory is an emotional memory about this person's life. 10.82 .001* 0.005  8.79 .004* 0.006 
The shared memory is an important memory for this person. 3.27 .006* 0.006  4.66 0.000* 0.004 
The shared memory represents the "real me" for this person. 0.70 0.40 --  0.06 0.80 -- 
This person thinks about the shared memory regularly. 7.85 .006* 0.007  1.18 0.28 -- 




Figure 11 - Univariate effects of memory type and memory immersion for manipulation check items. 
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The results indicate that, overall, the vignettes appear to be appropriately 
representing self-defining and everyday memories to the memory listeners. Furthermore, 
it does appear that the language used to share the memory also influences how the memory 
is perceived by memory listeners. Memory type and memory immersion were unrelated to 
the manipulation check items for representing an “important theme” and the “real me” 
However, these manipulation check items may be appropriate for an online study where 
participants have no background information on the memory sharer. Connecting a memory 
to a theme in a person’s life or their “real self” may require additional information about 
who the sharer is as a person, making these manipulation checks, at best, a stab in the dark. 
Excluding these items, it does appear the vignettes are appropriate representing the 
memories to the memory listeners. In the following analyses, I will explore how these 
shared memories influence (a) perceptions on memory phenomenology and (b) affective 
and informational outcomes for the memory listener.  
3.2.1 Perceptions of shared memory phenomenology.  
In Study 1, I explored the memory sharer’s self-reported ratings of memory 
phenomenology. In this section, I will address the perceived memory phenomenology of 
the memory listener. This perceived phenomenology addresses the ability to convey 
phenomenological information through words from the memory sharer to the memory 
listener. As additional manipulation checks, the following analyses will address the 
subscales of the adapted MEQ and the self-centrality scales (see Table 12 for descriptive 
and correlational statistics). 
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Table 12 - Memory sharer perceived phenomenological characteristics descriptive and correlation statistics. 
  n M SD α 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Vividness 105 4.63 0.45 0.88           
2. Coherence 108 4.31 0.50 0.78 0.59**          




4.03 0.60 0.82 0.50** 0.31** 0.51**        








4.18 0.75 0.87 0.51** 0.48** 0.42** 0.41** 0.25** 0.29**     
8. Sharing 111 3.42 0.86 0.90 0.22* -0.04 0.16 0.36** 0.52** 0 0.17    
9. Distance 113 1.94 0.77 0.85 -0.40** -0.39** -0.29** -0.35** -0.01 -0.30** -0.37** -0.15   




4.51 1.45 0.96 0.13 -0.1 0.08 0.27** 0.63** -0.12 0.08 0.49** 0.20* 0.08 
* p < .05, ** p < .01 
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 A MANOVA was conducted on the ten facets of the adapted MEQ. The results 
indicated a significant main effect of memory type, F(10, 78) = 12.50, Pillai’s trace = .62, 
p < .01, memory immersion, F(10, 78) = 22.77, Pillai’s trace = .74, p < .01, and a significant 
interaction term, F(10, 78) = 8.31, Pillai’s trace = .52, p < .01. Therefore, follow-up 
univariate tests were conducted with a Holm-Bonferroni correction to account for the 30 
subsequent tests. As shown in Table 13, (a) a main effect of memory type was found for 
the sensory-perceptual and sharing facets, (b) a crossover interaction with no main effects 
was found for coherence and distance, and (c) an interaction with significant main effects 
was found for emotional intensity and valence. Each of these results will be described in 
detail below. 
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Table 13 - Univariate tests of perceived memory phenomenology. 
  Memory Type  Memory Immersion  Interaction 
 F alpha 
Target 
alpha  F alpha 
Target 
alpha  F alpha 
Target 
alpha 
1. Vividness 5.09 0.03 --  2.41 0.12 --  5.19 0.02 -- 
2. Coherence 0.02 0.9 --  1.00 0.32 --  18.51 0.000* 0.002 
3. Accessibility 3.16 0.08 --  2.54 0.11 --  0.00 0.95 -- 
4. Sensory-perceptual detail 11.62 0.001* 0.002  3.14 0.08 --  1.46 0.23 -- 
5. Emotionality 46.37 0.000* 0.002  9.82 0.0022* 0.0024  11.59 0.001* 0.002 
6. Visual perspective 0.11 0.74 --  0.02 0.9 --  0.00 0.95 -- 
7. Time perspective 0.00 0.95 --  0.13 0.72 --  1.15 0.29 -- 
8. Sharing 25.12 0.000* 0.002  2.35 0.13 --  0.33 0.57 -- 
9. Distance 0.01 0.92 --  2.51 0.12 --  9.89 0.0021* 0.0023 
10. Valence 50.16 0.000* 0.002  116.14 0.000* 0.002  46.41 0.000* 0.002 
* Significant effect compared to Holm-Bonferroni corrected alpha.  
 92
 A significant main effect of memory type was found for sensory-perceptual detail 
and memory sharing, such that self-defining memories were rated as containing more 
sensory-perceptual detail and being shared more regularly than everyday memories (see 
Figure 12).  
 
 
Figure 12 - Main effect of memory type for phenomenological sensory detail and 
sharing.
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 A crossover interaction was found for memory coherence and memory distance 
(see Figure 13). These crossover interactions reveal that the level of memory coherence 
and distance depend simultaneously on the memory type and level of memory immersion. 
Memory coherence, for instance, is high when a self-defining memory is shared using high 
immersion language and when an everyday memory is shared using low immersion 
language. Similarly, distance from the memory is lower when a self-defining memory is 
shared using high immersion language and when an everyday memory is shared using low 
immersion language.  
 
 
Figure 13 - Crossover interaction for memory coherence and distance. 
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Finally, an interaction with main effects was found for emotional intensity and 
valence (see Figure 14). Participants rated self-defining memories as more emotionally 
intense and as less positive compared to everyday memories. High immersion memories 
were rated as more emotionally intense and more positive than low immersion memories. 
Furthermore, a significant interaction was found. Figure 14 shows that self-defining 
memories were rated as emotionally intense regardless of the memory immersion, while 
everyday memories were rated as more emotionally intense when described using highly 
immersive language. Interestingly, everyday memories were rated as generally positive 
regardless of the level of memory immersion, while self-defining memories were rated as 
very positive or very negative depending on their level of memory immersion. These 
results indicate that participants could detect a meaningful difference in memory 
phenomenology based on the memory type and level of memory immersion.  
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Figure 14 - Interaction of memory type and memory immersion for emotional 
intensity and valence.
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After investigating the facets of the Memory Experience Questionnaire, an 
additional ANOVA was conducted on the self-centrality scale, revealing a significant main 
effect of memory type, F(1, 108) = 32.39, p < .01, a significant main effect of memory 
immersion, F(1, 108) = 31.05, p < .01, and a significant interaction, F(1, 108) = 5.60, p = 
.02. As depicted in Figure 15 everyday memories were rated as less central to the sharer’s 
sense of self than self-defining memories. This effect was exacerbated when the shared 
memory was also low immersion. 
 
 
Figure 15 - Interaction of memory type and memory immersion for self-centrality.
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These results provide evidence for how shared memories are perceived by listeners. 
The results indicate that self-defining memories are perceived as containing more sensory-
perceptual detail and being shared more regularly than everyday memories. Perceived 
coherence and distance of the memory depends on a crossover interaction between memory 
type and memory immersion, and the perceived emotional intensity and emotional valence 
are exacerbated in self-defining memories regardless of the level of memory immersion. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, perceived self-centrality is highest in self-defining 
memories, with the decrease in self-centrality for everyday memories exacerbated in the 
low immersion condition. As self-centrality is a key definitional part of the distinction 
between self-defining and everyday memories, this provides additional confidence that the 
memory manipulations were working as expected.  
3.2.2 Affective outcomes.  
In this section, I will address how memory type and memory immersion influence 
the conveyance of information to the memory listener to inform the affective outcomes of 
(a) likability, (b) affective trust, and (c) empathy (for descriptive and correlations, see Table 
14). As this study is emphasizing the memory listener’s experience, perceived centrality 
will be included as a covariate in the following analyses. While I expect, and have initial 
evidence supporting, that self-defining and high immersion memories will be viewed as 
more central to the sharer’s sense of self, there is still likely a great deal of variability in 
how the listener perceives a memory. As it is this perception that I am interested in, 
perceived self-centrality will be included to parse out the unique effects of memory type, 
memory immersion, and self-centrality on affective outcomes. 
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Table 14 - Affective and informational outcomes descriptive and correlation statistics. 
  n M SD α 1 2 3 4 5 
Affective trust 113 3.88 0.54 0.83 --     
Empathy 113 3.69 0.77 0.89  0.48** --    
Likability 113 4.13 0.52 0.91  0.66**  0.54** --   
Insight 113 3.64 0.39 0.81  0.58**  0.25**   0.63** --  
Meaning 113 4.17 0.70 0.95  0.20*   0.39**  0.33**  0.46** -- 
Cognitive trust 113 4.18 0.45 0.82  0.34**  0.32**   0.48**  0.45**  0.33** 
 * p < .05, ** p < .01 
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 To that end, a multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) was conducted to 
explore the effects of memory type, memory immersion, and perceived self-centrality on 
likability, affective trust, and empathy. The results indicate a significant main effect of 
memory type, F(3, 106) = 7.65, Pillai’s trace = .18, p < .01, and a significant main effect 
of perceived self-centrality, F(3, 106) = 14.11, Pillai’s trace = .29, p < .01. A significant 
effect was not found for memory immersion, F(3, 106) = 2.18, Pillai’s trace = .06, p = .10, 
or the interaction between memory type and memory immersion, F(3, 106) = .47, Pillai’s 
trace = .01, p = .70 (H15a, H15b, H15c, not supported). Therefore, these terms were not 
included in the follow-up univariate tests. These results indicate that memory immersion 
did not moderate the relationship between memory type and affective outcomes.  
 The follow-up tests reveal that, after Holm-Bonferroni correction, perceived self-
centrality is a significant predictor of likability, affective trust, and empathy (see Table 15). 
Specifically, when memories were rated higher on self-centrality, the imagined memory 
sharer was rated as more likeable, more affectively trustworthy, and eliciting more empathy 
(see Figure 16). After Bonferroni-Holm corrections to control for Type I error rates, 
memory type was not related to any of the affective outcomes (H9, H10, H11, not 
supported). This suggests that it is the perceived self-centrality of the shared memory, not 
the memory type per se, that influences ratings of affective outcomes. 
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Table 15 - Univariate tests for affective outcomes. 
  Memory Type   Self-centrality 
 F alpha 
Target 
alpha  F alpha 
Target 
alpha 
Affective trust 1.03 0.310 --  49.39 0.000* 0.008 
Empathy 4.68 0.033 --  12.12 0.001* 0.013 
Likability 4.52 0.036 --  22.61 0.000* 0.010 
* Significant effect compared to Holm-Bonferroni corrected alpha.  
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Figure 16 - Influence of self-centrality on affective connections of affective trust, 
empathy, and likability.
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3.2.3 Informational outcomes.  
Finally, the influence of shared memories on the informational outcomes of insight, 
meaningful work, and cognitive trust was investigated (see Table 14 for descriptive and 
correlation statistics). As discussed above, perceived self-centrality was included as a 
covariate in the following analyses. The results of a MANCOVA reveal a significant main 
effect of memory type, F(3, 106) = 6.74, Pillai’s trace = .16, p < .01, memory immersion, 
F(3, 106) = 21.23, Pillai’s trace = .38, p < .01, and perceived self-centrality, F(3, 106) = 
14.54, Pillai’s trace = .29, p < .01. Finally, a significant interaction was between memory 
type and memory immersion was also found, F(3, 106) = 6.65, Pillai’s trace = .16, p < .01. 
Therefore, all four of these terms were included in the follow-up univariate tests (see Table 
16). 
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Table 16 - Univariate tests for informational outcomes. 
  Memory Type   Memory Immersion   Self-centrality   Interaction 
 F alpha 
Target 
alpha  F alpha 
Target 
alpha  F alpha 
Target 
alpha   F alpha 
Target 
alpha 
Insight 1.31 0.26 --   7.5 0.007 --   31.99 0.000* 0.005  3.34 0.070 -- 
Meaning 9.24 0.003* 0.006  60.68 0.000* 0.004  13.07 0.000* 0.005  4.334 0.040 -- 
Cognitive trust 0.001 0.97 --  2.72 0.102 --  0.544 0.463 --  5.353 0.023 -- 
* Significant effect compared to Holm-Bonferroni corrected alpha.  
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 After Holm-Bonferroni correction, a significant effect of memory type, memory 
immersion, and perceived self-centrality was found for work meaningfulness (see Figure 
17). Specifically, imagined memory sharers who shared a self-defining memory were rated 
as having more meaningful work than those who shared everyday memories (H12, 
supported). Similarly, imagined memory sharers who shared high immersion memories 
were rated as having more meaningful work than those who shared low immersion 
memories. A significant interaction between memory type and memory immersion was not 
found (H15d, not supported), suggesting that an additive effect between memory type and 
memory immersion did not occur. Finally, when memories were rated as high on self-
centrality, the imagined memory sharer was also perceived as having more meaningful 
work than those who shared memories low on self-centrality. 
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Figure 17 - Influence of memory type, memory immersion, and self-centrality on informational outcome of work meaningfulness.
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 After Holm-Bonferroni correction, a significant effect of self-centrality was found 
on ratings of memory sharer’s insight, such that when memories are rated as high on self-
centrality, the imagined memory sharer is perceived as more insightful (see Figure 18). No 




Figure 18 - Influence of self-centrality on informational outcome of insight.
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 Finally, memory type, memory immersion, and perceived self-centrality did not 
relate to cognitive trust (H14, H15f, not supported).  
3.2.4 Exploratory analyses.  
In addition to the primary hypotheses addressed above, three additional questions 
were asked to assess future behavioral intentions. Specifically, the memory listener was 
asked about their likelihood to share an (a) personal memory, (b) emotional memory, and 
(c) important memory with the imagined memory sharer. The results of a MANOVA reveal 
a significant main effect of perceived self-centrality on memory sharing likelihood, F(3, 
106) = 3.77, Pillai’s trace = .10, p = .01. Subsequent univariate analyses revealed that 
perceived self-centrality was positively related to all three items (see Table 17), such that 
memories perceived to be high on self-centrality led to higher likelihood ratings for sharing 
a personal, emotional, and important memory with the memory sharer (see Figure 19). 
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Table 17 - Univariate tests for likelihood of sharing own memory. 
  Self-centrality 
 F alpha 
Target 
alpha 
Likely to share a personal memory. 7.489 0.007* 0.050 
Likely to share an emotional memory. 14.12 0.000* 0.025 
Likely to share an important memory. 14.62 0.000* 0.017 
* Significant effect compared to Holm-Bonferroni corrected alpha.  
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Figure 19 - Influence of self-centrality on likelihood of sharing a personal, emotional, 
and important memory with the memory sharer.
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3.2.5 Summary of results for the memory listener.  
Overall, the hypotheses for Study 2 were not supported. Self-defining memories were 
not reliably related to affective or informational outcomes, high immersion memories were 
not more effective at conveying memory information to influence those outcomes. 
However, exploratory analyses did reveal some interesting effects. First, memory type and 
memory immersion did influence some perceptions of memory phenomenology for the 
memory listener. This suggests that shared memories can communicate some 
phenomenological characteristics from the memory sharer to the memory listener. Second, 
while memory type and memory immersion were unrelated to affective and informational 
outcomes, the perceived self-centrality of the shared memory was significantly related to 
all affective and most informational outcomes.  
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CHAPTER 4. GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The sharing of self-defining memories provides a mechanism for individuals to share 
a small, personal piece of their temporally extended self with others. These memories 
contain vivid and emotional records of goal attainment or goal failure that are tied to 
ongoing life concerns. By sharing these memories with others, individuals can break off a 
self-contained piece of important, meaningful self-experience and share it with another. 
From the listener’s perspective, the hearing of work self-defining memories provides a 
vivid snapshot of others’ lives that provides valuable information about who that individual 
is as a professional. This information can then be used to inform a variety of affective and 
informational outcomes and even affect the likelihood of future memory sharing within the 
dyad. While the memory sharing process is undoubtedly complex, these studies provide a 
first step to understanding the role of sharing self-defining memories, and more broadly 
the temporally extended self, with others at work. In this section, I will discuss (a) the 
memory sharing process from the memory sharer to the memory listener, (b) limitations of 
these studies, and (c) future directions of research for self-defining memories in the 
workplace.  
4.1 The Memory Sharer 
The first piece of the memory sharing processes addresses the experience of the 
memory sharer. Specifically, it addresses the recall of a specific memory (self-defining or 
everyday memory), the accompanying phenomenology of the recollected memory, and 
how that memory is communicated through language to others. It is this communication of 
the memory from the sharer to the listener that is of interest in Study 1. Personal 
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experiences are inherently unique; I will never fully understand another’s experience as I 
cannot live it myself. As such, language is often the best mechanism we have to share our 
unique experiences with others, and the words we use are tasked with conveying the 
emotional, meaningful, and vivid (or dispassionate, trivial, and mundane) nature of our 
experiences to others. Therefore, in Study 1, the communication of memory characteristics 
through language is of primary interest.  
In this study, participants are asked to recall a self-defining memory (i.e., “a 
memory about an enduring theme, issue, or conflict from your life”) or an everyday 
memory (i.e., “a memory that was personally experienced”). Subsequently, they are asked 
to rate their recollected memory on a host of phenomenological characteristics. It was 
hypothesized that self-defining memories are characterized by greater phenomenological 
(H1) sensory-perceptual detail, (H2) emotionality, (H3) autonoesis, and (H4) self-
centrality than everyday memories. However, these hypotheses were largely unsupported. 
Specifically, self-defining and everyday memories did not differ in the amount of sensory-
perceptual detail (H1, not supported), emotionality (H2, not supported), and autonoesis 
(H3, not supported). However, self-defining memories were characterized by higher levels 
of self-centrality than everyday memories, providing support for Hypothesis 4. As self-
centrality is a definitional part of self-defining memories, however, this finding is not 
particularly novel.  
More concerning is the lack of significant findings associated with 
phenomenological sensory-perceptual detail, emotionality, and autonoesis, as assessed by 
the MEQ. The lack of findings for the phenomenological characteristics of sensory-
perceptual detail, emotionality, and autonoesis may be due to a combination of four things: 
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(1) the participants were providing poor responses that are obscuring the effect, (2) self-
defining and everyday memories do not differ on these phenomenological variables and 
are equally immersive, (3) the updated memory manipulation was not eliciting appropriate 
memories or (4) the scale was unable to capture the differences in these phenomenological 
characteristics.  
The first option of poor participant responses seems unlikely. While the sample of 
Mechanical Turk workers may be cause for concern, there is not substantial evidence 
suggesting the participants were responding mindlessly. First, participants in the study had 
to successfully pass three attention check items for inclusion in the final sample (e.g., 
Please select “Agree”). Second, participants had to complete a 500-word writing task, 
which was read to ascertain that (a) the writing was intelligible and (b) the memory was 
on-topic. While six participants were discarded from the final sample for failing these 
checks, the remaining 157 participants passed these cutoffs. This suggests that, at the very 
least, participants were reading the instructions and survey items with enough detail to 
respond appropriately. Additionally, the internal consistency for the MEQ facets was quite 
high (α ≥ .70, see Table 7) despite the presence of reverse-scored items. This provides 
additional evidence that participants were not responding with biased response sets (e.g., 
responding “Strongly agree” to every item) and were reading the items with enough 
attention to catch the change in directionality. Furthermore, multiple studies have found 
that Mechanical Turk workers perform similarly to other internet and laboratory 
convenience samples (Crump et al., 2013; Horton et al., 2011; Paolacci et al., 2010; Shariff 
& Norenzayan, 2007), suggesting that the lack of effects may not be attributable, entirely, 
to the sample. While it is, of course, possible that the Mechanical Turk sample was 
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inappropriate for this study, it seems unlikely. Thus, this potential explanation will be 
discarded. 
Second, the lack of significant phenomenological differences may be simply 
because my hypotheses are wrong, and self-defining and everyday memories do not differ 
appreciably in phenomenology. However, I am not yet ready to concede this point, despite 
the lack of significant findings. Other studies have found that self-defining memories are 
rated as more vivid, emotional, self-revealing, and important than everyday memories 
comparing normal and autistic adults (Crane et al., 2010; Goddard et al., 2017). 
Furthermore, it is an intuitive and definitional part of self-defining memories that they are 
characterized by “affective intensity, vividness, high levels of rehearsal, linkage to similar 
memories, and connection to an enduring concern or unresolved conflict” (Conway, 
Singer, Tagini, 2004, p. 504). While some everyday memories may also be 
idiosyncratically vivid, autonoetic, and emotional, many them should be comparatively 
mundane. If self-defining and everyday memories are not distinguishable along these 
phenomenological dimensions, then this poses a substantial problem for the field and 
requires a new definition of self-defining memories that does not rely on memory 
phenomenology. However, the linguistic analysis does not support this interpretation, 
indicating that self-defining and everyday memories are shared using different language. 
The linguistic differences between self-defining and everyday memories will be discussed 
in greater detail below. However, for now, the explanation that self-defining and everyday 
memories do not phenomenologically differ will be set aside.  
The third potential explanation for the lack of phenomenological findings is that 
the adapted memory manipulation was unable to elicit appropriate memories. This 
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explanation has mixed support. First, the manipulation check items reveal that self-defining 
memories are more (a) important, (b) representing the “real” me, (c) thought about 
regularly, (d) describing an important theme form my life, (e) emotional, and (f) reflecting 
who I am as a person for the memory sharer than everyday memories. This suggests that 
the manipulation could appropriately elicit self-defining and everyday memories. Second, 
the changes to the memory manipulation were primarily to the self-defining memory task 
to remove extraneous manipulations (e.g., changing an attribute from “the only aspect is 
that it leads to strong feelings” to “it can be a memory that evokes little or no emotion”). 
While these changes may have the effect of dampening the self-defining memory 
characteristics, that does not appear to have happened. The average scores for the self-
defining memory group on phenomenological sensory-perceptual detail, emotionality, and 
autonoesis were all above a 4 on a 1 to 5 scale (see Table 3). If there was a dampening of 
phenomenological characteristics by the adapted task, its effect was minimal. 
However, an additional change was made to the everyday memory task. 
Specifically, the writing prompt of sharing a personal memory with a person you just met 
was included in the everyday memory task to make it identical to the self-defining memory 
task (see Appendix B). While this prompt was edited to remove language referring to the 
“Real You” and “not trying to play a role or to strike a pose” (see Appendix A), this writing 
prompt may have influenced the types of memories recalled for the everyday memory 
condition. Specifically, it may have led to the recall of more vivid, emotional, and 
autonoetic memories than intended, thus leading to the insignificant effects. However, the 
changes in the memory manipulation do not appear to account for the entire problem. 
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Finally, the lack of significant results may be attributable, at least in part, to 
psychometric issues associated with the MEQ. As depicted in Figure 8, all 10 facets 
suffered from ceiling or floor effects. However, the CES did not suffer from similar issues 
and follows an approximately normal distribution. This suggests that the MEQ may be 
suffering from psychometric issues unique to this scale. Furthermore, the psychometric 
issues may be influenced, at least in part, by the adaptation of the memory manipulation. 
Self-centrality was directly manipulated in the self-defining and everyday memory tasks 
while the other phenomenological characteristics were controlled in the manipulation. This 
adapted memory manipulation and the psychometric issues with the MEQ may be working 
in concert to contribute to the lack of significant effects. Of course, it is still possible that 
self-defining and everyday memories do not actually differ along these phenomenological 
dimensions, but it seems more likely that manipulation and scaling issues contributed to 
the non-significant findings. Future research should explore this possibility by testing 
different adaptations to the memory manipulations and assessing phenomenology with an 
adapted MEQ or a different phenomenological scale entirely.  
However, an alternative interpretation of the lack of significant findings for 
memory type on sensory-perceptual detail, emotionality, and autonoesis paints these 
findings in a more promising light. As addressed above, the memory manipulation was 
adapted to be equal between the self-defining and everyday memory conditions in all ways 
except for the connection to an enduring theme, issue, or conflict in the sharers life. The 
level of vividness, emotion, and rehearsal were not manipulated between memory types. 
Thus, the lack of significant differences between self-defining and everyday memories on 
these phenomenological characteristics may be viewed as successful controlling for 
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ancillary nuisance variables. As the connection to the sense of self is the primary 
component of a self-defining memory, these findings may also suggest that the memory 
manipulation successfully affected this critical dimension while holding ancillary 
phenomenological characteristics constant.  
Despite the largely insignificant effects for phenomenological sensory-perceptual 
detail, emotionality, autonoesis, and self-centrality for self-defining and everyday 
memories, additional analyses were conducted exploring the linguistic strategies used to 
share memories. Specifically, it was hypothesized that (H5) memories high on sensory-
perceptual detail would be shared using more perceptual process words, (H6) memories 
high on emotionality would be shared using more emotional tone words, (H7) memories 
high on autonoesis would be shared using more personal pronouns, and (H8) memories 
high on self-centrality would be shared with more authentic tone words. These hypotheses 
were not supported. In regression and path analyses, sensory-perceptual detail was 
unrelated to perceptual process words (H5, not supported), emotionality was unrelated to 
emotional tone words (H6, not supported), autonoesis was unrelated to personal pronouns 
(H7, not supported), and self-centrality was not related to authentic tone words (H8, not 
supported). This lack of findings may be due, in part, to the psychometric issues associated 
with the MEQ discussed above. The lack of meaningful variability in the sensory-
perceptual detail, emotionality, and autonoesis scales may have precluded them from 
relating to any linguistic strategies. However, the CES did not suffer from these 
psychometric issues and was still unrelated to authentic tone words. As such, it is possible 
that the wrong linguistic strategies were investigated.  
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While the hypothesized linguistic strategies were unrelated to memory type, many 
other linguistic strategies differed across self-defining and everyday memories. Self-
defining memories were characterized by less first-person plural pronouns (e.g., we) and 
more second person pronouns (e.g., you). If pronoun usage is taken to reflect the allocation 
of attention of the memory sharer (Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010), this suggests that shared 
self-defining memories are more focused on the individual’s personal experience. An 
overview of common “you” phrases in participant responses also reveals an emphasis on 
the self. In the shared memories, the word “you” is often referring to things that could or 
did happen to the memory sharer. For example, one individual describes the dangers of 
working in a kitchen.  
“Being alone in a situation like a kitchen can get pretty dicey (pardon the pun). 
There are tons of things on which you can injure yourself. You can set yourself on 
fire, you can cut yourself, drop something heavy on yourself, or simply slip on the 
tile flooring that nearly every kitchen incorporates so as to aid easy cleanup at the 
end of the day. I've done each of these things at least once in my career and a few 
of them multiple times.” Male, Age 35, Kitchen Manager. 
Another participant describes meetings she has with her team lead.  
“Team leads in my company frequently have what we call 'touch-bases,' which 
are brief meetings of reflection and discussion of your recent performance and 
what you have been doing to achieve your goals and what you could do better to 
get to where you want to be.” Female, Age 25, Retail Manager.  
These examples demonstrate the use of “you” as a linguistic device, also referred to as the 
“generic-you” (Orvell, Kross, & Gelman, 2017). The use of a generic-you is typically used 
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to express norms, which can then be compared to personal experience to derive insights 
and engage in meaning-making about self-experience. This memory making process is 
evidenced by the following participants’ experience in a touch-base meeting, as a 
continuation of the vignette described above.  
“I went into the meeting with my store manager with supreme confidence and the 
self-assurance… When I got into the office with them though, things slowly 
unraveled to portray a different story than what my perception of reality was…. 
They voiced that they felt there was some kind of disconnect between my 
performance and my confidence/amount of time I had been working in the store 
and where I should actually be. This was a pivotal moment for me because I realized 
I had to put myself in check. I can be confident, yes, but confidence and cockiness 
are two different things and I was leaning more towards the latter rather than the 
former and it was hindering me from true success. I was too focused at the time on 
how good I thought I was versus being able to recognize what I can improve on…. 
It was after this somewhat harsh wakeup call that I was able to realize my true 
potential, and in using my newfound ability of perspective taking I found myself 
promoted to a management position for the highest volume department in the store 
after only a couple of months.” Female, Age 25, Retail Manager. 
Thus, the increased use of generic-you in self-defining memories reflects an emphasis on 
the self and engagement in meaning-making processes to contextual past experiences. This 
contrasts with the increased use of personal plural pronouns (we) in everyday memories. 
The use of personal plural pronouns reflects an emphasis on social or professional groups 
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in everyday memories, while self-defining memories focus on the personal experience of 
the memory sharer.  
Self-defining memories are also characterized by more positive emotion and more 
causal words. Self-defining memories typically contain descriptions of the memory sharer 
overcoming some hurdle at work. Furthermore, self-defining memories are characterized 
by stronger achievement and power drives. The increased achievement and power drives 
similarly describe the movement towards some end goal. For example, this individual 
describes their decision to leave their job for a leadership position in a new agency.  
“So, after talking the issues through with my family, friends, and work family, I 
did the only thing I could do: I left…. While I still am an attorney for the 
government, I took a leadership position in another agency. It was somewhat 
difficult leaving legal areas in which I was an acknowledged expert and it was 
very difficult leaving my old work family, but, as I just passed the one-year 
anniversary of that decision, I believe I can say that I made the right decision for 
both my career advancement and for my personal mental health. In the year since 
I left, I have received not one, but TWO raises after several years with no raise as 
a result of budget conditions. And I am now recognized as the expert in a couple 
of other areas of the law. Perhaps most importantly, I am back on the path to 
achieving my ultimate career ambitions. I even still see my old work family 
decently regularly and my awesome old work wife very often. So, while the 
change I made was difficult, in the end, it has paid off well. Change is inevitable 
and sometimes is the harbinger of better things.” Male, Age 37, General Counsel.  
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This memory demonstrates the general theme in self-defining memories of overcoming a 
hurdle. This individual caused a positive change in his life that allowed him to move on to 
bigger and better things. 
Finally, self-defining memories are associated with decreased use of clout and 
visual perceptual process words. This was in the opposite direction than expected. Clout 
refers to the confidence and expertise characterizing the language, with high clout 
reflecting more confidence and low clout reflecting a more tentative or humble 
communication style (Pennebaker, Booth, et al., 2015). The inverse effect of clout may be 
due to the comparative ambiguity associated with self-defining memories compared to 
everyday memories. A self-defining memory is connected to a long-term, higher order 
goal, which is typically less concrete than a common, everyday memory. This may have 
led to the decreased confidence in the descriptions of self-defining memories. The inverse 
effect of visual perceptual process words may be explained by the focus of attention for 
the memory sharer. Self-defining memories are typically memories of achievement that 
focus on how this memory is important to the sharer’s life, and these memories were shared 
using language that reflected that focus. Everyday memories, on the other hand, typically 
lacked that connection to a higher order goal. Lacking that connection, the language used 
to describe those memories reflects a more immediate and sensory focus. For example, see 
the following memory of a mistake made while loading a semi-truck trailer.  
“I hopped back into my tractor, push the clutch in and slide into 2nd gear to start 
the trailers slow roll. My tractor starts to roll forward with me looking to my right 
to gauge my turn radius and BOOM! I look back half scared to death and I see 
that my trailer has slid off of my tractor and slammed on the floor! My first 
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thought was, "There goes my job." With the help of my adrenaline, I jump out and 
use all my strength and weight to crank the legs on the trailer to get it up to the 
height of the tractor before anyone can notice my embarrassing rookie mistake. 
After about 20 grueling cranks it was high up enough to let the air out of my 
tractors rear bags to lower the fifth-wheel and slide underneath the trailer again 
with my windows rolled down this time to make sure I hear the click of the lock. I 
wiped the sweat and water from my forehead and drove off like nothing 
happened.” Male, Age 25, Truck Driver 
The focus of this memory on the immediate timeframe in which the memory occurred 
contrasts starkly with the previous self-defining memory of changing jobs. The self-
defining memory described the repercussions of that decision broadly, while this everyday 
memory describes in detail what happened during the memory event. The increased use of 
visual process words in everyday memories may reflect this increased focus on the memory 
event and decreased focus on the larger repercussions of the event for the individual’s life.  
 Taking these linguistic characteristics, these findings indicate that self-defining 
memories are shared using language that is more self-focused and reflecting a positive and 
causal orientation towards achievement and power drives. This paints a picture of self-
defining memories representing movements from bad to good and achieving higher order 
goals. This suggests that self-defining memories, compared to everyday memories, may 
reflect redemption narratives where individuals overcome some obstacle and obtain a 
measure of success (McAdams et al., 2001) 
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In summary, this study has focused on the recollection and sharing of self-defining 
and everyday memories. The hypotheses for this study were largely unsupported. Self-
defining and everyday memories did not reliably relate to different phenomenological 
characteristics, and memory phenomenology did not influence linguistic strategies for the 
shared memory. Despite the lack of significant effects, exploratory analyses did reveal that 
self-defining and everyday memories were shared using different linguistic strategies. This 
suggests that, despite the lack of significant hypothesized results, self-defining and 
everyday memories are communicated differently to others. In the next section, I will focus 
on the receiver of this communication to determine if (a) memory type and level of memory 
immersion influences the conveyance of information to the memory listener and (b) if this 
information is used to inform affective and informational outcomes.  
4.2 The Memory Listener 
The second piece of the memory sharing process addresses the experience of the 
memory listener. Specifically, it addresses how (a) a shared memory is used to influence 
affective and informational outcomes for the memory listener and (b) how the 
phenomenological characteristics of the shared information affect the strength of that 
relationship. Self-defining memories contain personal and meaningful information about 
the self. Sharing this information with others may aid in the development and maintenance 
of affective bonds (Alea & Bluck, 2003). Furthermore, the personal information conveyed 
in self-defining memories can also influence the development of informational connections 
between the sharer and listener. Finally, the phenomenological characteristics of shared 
memories may influence the efficacy of memory communication, such that highly 
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immersive memories may be better equipped to develop affective and informational 
connections than low immersion memories.  
Real memory vignettes were selected from Study 1 for inclusion in this study based 
on their memory type (self-defining or everyday memory) and memory immersion (high 
or low immersion). Vignettes from Study1 were used because they reflect real memories, 
not artificial vignettes with manufactured phenomenology. The high and low immersion 
memories were selected based on their linguistic characteristics of achievement, affect, 
visual perceptual processes, and first-person singular pronouns. These dimensions were 
chosen to attempt to select memories that could communicate high or low 
phenomenological immersion to the memory listener.  
The manipulation check items generally indicate that these vignettes were 
communicating meaningful information about the self from the memory sharer to the 
memory listener. Specifically, self-defining and high immersion memories were rated more 
emotional and important. Furthermore, self-defining memories were perceived to be shared 
more regularly and high immersion memories were thought to be more reflective of the 
person. This suggests that the self-defining vignettes were perceived as more self-defining, 
and high immersion memories could more efficaciously communicate that information. An 
interactive effect was not found, suggesting that memory immersion did not lead to 
synergistic effects in conveying self-defining information.  
Interestingly, memory type and memory immersion were unrelated to manipulation 
check ratings of the extent to which the memory reflected an important theme or the 
sharer’s “real me.” This may be due to the impoverished communication between the 
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sharer and listener in this study. The listener is only given one memory with no additional 
information about the memory sharer, making it difficult to place the memory within the 
broader context of the sharer’s life. Ratings of the “real me” and connections to life themes 
may require more background information of the memory sharer to be reliably assessed. 
Thus, these ratings may be more informative of the memory sharing process between 
known coworkers or acquaintances. Despite these limitations, the manipulation checks 
provide initial evidence that the vignettes were perceived by the memory listeners as 
providing self-defining information based on the memory type and level of memory 
immersion.  
 A main premise of this study is that the language used to share memories will 
influence perceptions of the memory phenomenology, such as a memory being shared with 
more perceptual process words being perceived as containing more sensory-perceptual 
detail. This proposition was partially supported as the shared memories were perceived by 
the memory listener to have different phenomenological characteristics. Notably, self-
defining memories were rated as containing more sensory-perceptual information and 
being shared more regularly than everyday memories. This contrasts with Study 1, where 
no phenomenological differences were found across self-defining or everyday memories 
as rated by the memory sharer. The significant effect of memory type of sensory-perceptual 
detail is particularly interesting, as it suggests that self-defining memories are perceived as 
more detailed and containing more sensory information than everyday memories. 
Interestingly, no effect was found for memory immersion on perceptions of sensory-
perceptual detail. This suggests that there is something about self-defining memories 
generally that is driving this perception.  
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Crossover effects were also found for the phenomenological characteristics of 
coherence and distance, such that the high immersion self-defining memory and low 
immersion everyday memory were rated as more coherent and less distance than their 
counterparts. While initially unintuitive, this may reflect a departure from the memory 
listener’s expectations for the shared self-defining and everyday memories. As 
hypothesized in Study 1, self-defining memories are thought to be, on average, more 
immersive than everyday memories. When the memory conforms to this expectation (e.g., 
a high immersion self-defining memory or a low immersion everyday memory), the 
memory is rated as more coherent and less distant. When the memory does not conform to 
expectations, such as a low immersion self-defining memory or a high immersion everyday 
memory, the memory is rated as less coherent and more distant. This suggests that listeners 
have preconceived expectations about how a particular type of memory is shared, and 
departures from that conception lead to the memory being perceived as less coherent and 
more distant.  
Furthermore, an interaction was found for memory type and memory immersion on 
emotional intensity and emotion valence, suggesting that the relationship between self-
defining memories and affective intensity is exacerbated by high immersion. Specifically, 
everyday memories are rated as less emotionally intense than self-defining memories, and 
this effect was exacerbated by low memory immersion. Similarly, everyday memories were 
perceived as generally positive, with the self-defining memories being perceived as either 
very positive or very negative, depending on the level of memory immersion. This further 
reflects the affectively intense nature of self-defining memories.  
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 Finally, a significant interaction was found for perceived self-centrality. While self-
defining memories were rated as more central to the sharer’s sense of self than the everyday 
memories, this effect was exacerbated by high immersion. This interactive effect of 
memory type and memory immersion on perceived self-centrality is of importance. As 
discussed above in the section on the memory sharer, the centrality of the memory to the 
sharer’s sense of self is definitional to a self-defining memory. The influence of memory 
immersion on self-centrality suggests that highly immersive memories are better able to 
communicate that self-central information to the memory sharer, and the effect is 
exacerbated when paired with a self-defining memory. This suggests that memory type and 
memory immersion can communicate meaningful information about the sharer’s self to the 
memory listener.  
These findings provide tentative support for the proposition that shared memories 
can communicate memory phenomenology to the memory sharer. These results contrast 
with Study 1, where memory phenomenology as reported by the memory sharer was 
unrelated to memory type. Of course, the vignettes in this study were selected based on 
their linguistic characteristics, which likely influenced the perceptions of the memory 
listener. However, these results provide initial evidence that memory type and memory 
immersion contribute to different aspects of perceived memory phenomenology for the 
memory listener.  
In addition to contributing to the perceived memory phenomenology, this study 
explored if sharing memories with others contributed to the development of affective 
connections. Specifically, it was hypothesized that self-defining memories, compared to 
everyday memories, increased (H9) likability, (H10) affective trust, and (H11) empathy for 
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the memory sharer. Furthermore, it was hypothesized that memory immersion would 
moderate the relationship between memory type and (H15a) likability, (H15b) affective 
trust, and (H15c) empathy. As this study is focused on the perceptions of the memory 
listener, perceived self-centrality was also included in these analyses to determine if the 
listener’s perceptions of the shared memory affected its influence on affective outcomes. 
These hypotheses were not supported. Specifically, memory type is unrelated to ratings of 
likability (H9, not supported), affective trust (H10, not supported), and empathy (H11, not 
supported. Similarly, an interaction effect is not found between memory type and memory 
immersion for likability (H15a, not supported), affective trust (H15b, not supported), and 
empathy (H15c, not supported). However, perceived self-centrality is positively related to 
the affective outcomes of likability, affective trust, and empathy. This suggests that it is 
not the type of memory or the level of immersion that is informative, but the listener’s 
perception of the shared memory. This further emphasizes the importance of the listener’s 
experience in the memory sharing process for understanding how the information 
contained in the memory is used. 
In addition to these affective outcomes, the effect of memory type and memory 
immersion informational outcomes was also explored. Specifically, it was hypothesized 
that the self-defining memories would lead to higher perceptions of (H12) work 
meaningfulness, (H13) insight, and (H14) cognitive trust. Furthermore, it was hypothesized 
that memory immersion would moderate the effect of memory type on (H15d) work 
meaningfulness, (H15e) insight, and (H15f) cognitive trust. These results received partial 
support. A significant main effect of memory type is found for ratings of work 
meaningfulness, suggesting that self-defining memories convey information about the 
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memory sharer’s meaningful work (H12, supported). However, a significant moderating 
effect of memory immersion was not found (H15d, not supported). The remaining 
hypotheses addressing insight and cognitive trust were not supported. Specifically, self-
defining memories did not lead to higher ratings of insight (H13, not supported) or 
cognitive trust (H15, not supported), and the relationship between memory type and insight 
and cognitive trust was not moderated by memory immersion (H15e, H15f, not supported).  
However, perceived self-centrality was related to ratings of work meaningfulness 
and insight, once again highlighting the importance of the listener’s experience in the 
memory sharing process. Perceived self-centrality was not related to cognitive trust, but an 
inspection of the cognitive trust items reveals that the measure is unlikely to be influenced 
by a single instance of memory sharing. For example, it is unlikely that a single shared 
memory will influence perceptions of the sharer’s “competence and preparation for the 
job” or beliefs that the sharer “approaches his/her job with professionalism and dedication.” 
Instead, these ratings are more likely influenced by a history of working together and 
shared experiences where an individual’s behavior can be directly observed. It is possible 
that memory sharing may have a larger impact on cognitive trust when it is done in the 
context of a working relationship instead of a single shared memory with minimal 
contextual and personal information.  
In addition to affective and informational outcomes, exploratory analyses were 
conducted to determine if sharing memories with others influenced the likelihood of future 
behaviors. Specifically, perceived self-centrality was positively related to the likelihood of 
the memory listener sharing their own personal, emotional, and important memory with 
the memory sharer. This once again illustrates the importance of the memory listener’s 
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experience for understanding how the information contained in a shared memory is used 
to inform various outcomes.  
While the hypothesized relationships in the study were largely unsupported, these 
findings highlight the importance of considering the listener’s perspective in the memory 
sharing process. When considering how the listener will use the information contained in 
a shared memory, it is more important to consider how the listener interprets the memory 
than how the sharer perceives their own memory. While memory type (self-defining vs. 
everyday memory) did not reliably influence affective or informational outcomes, the 
listener’s perception of the shared memory did. As already discussed, memory sharing is 
an imperfect process that is limited by our ability to communicate through words. This 
study highlights a complementary, yet less obvious, limitation. Not only is memory sharing 
limited by the words the sharer uses to describe the memory, but is also limited by how the 
listener interprets the shared memory. Memories that are perceived by the listener as more 
central to the sharer’s sense of self are better able to develop affective and informational 
outcomes than memories perceived as less central or auxiliary to the sharer’s sense of self.  
4.3 Memory Sharing Process.  
The memory sharing process involves the sharing of a memory from the sharer to 
the listener through language. In these studies, I break down the memory sharing process 
into two distinct pieces: the experience of the memory sharer and the experience of the 
memory listener. Broadly, these studies provide evidence that self-defining and everyday 
memories are shared with others using different linguistic strategies. Furthermore, the 
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listener’s perception of the shared memory influences how the memory is used by the 
memory listener to develop affective and informational outcomes with the memory sharer.  
These studies in conjunction provide evidence for the utility of studying the social 
sharing of self-defining memories at work. The workplace is undoubtedly a social space, 
and individuals are increasingly required to work with others in team settings. Sharing self-
defining memories provides one mechanism for developing and maintaining these affective 
connections. The practical implications of this study are potentially widespread and can 
have implications for organizations at multiple levels. At the team level, self-defining 
memory sharing interventions could be used as an easy, inexpensive way to jumpstart the 
development of affective connections among team members. Team members can be 
encouraged to share personally meaningful information about themselves early in the life 
of a team to increase affective trust and likability, which is related to several desirable team 
outcomes (Colquitt et al., 2007; Costa, 2003; Schaubroeck, Lam, & Peng, 2011).  
Continuing in this vein, these findings may shed light on how leaders can convey 
information about themselves and their work to followers. The self-disclosing nature of 
self-defining memories can aid develop of affective and informational outcomes in the 
follower for the leader. These enhanced connections, in particular, may lead to the 
development of a transformational leadership style. By effectively communicating 
meaningful, and potentially curated, information about the self to others, leaders can use 
memory sharing to elicit affective connections and convey personally meaningful 
information about themselves and their work to enhance interpersonal connections. 
Managers can share memories central to their sense of self to convey personal information 
such as insight or work meaningfulness to subordinates, or elicit these memories from 
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employees to better understand their self-experience. Finally, any worker can share a 
meaningful memory with a coworker to develop affective connections or convey personal 
information.  
From a theoretical perspective, these studies demonstrate the importance of 
personal, unique experiences for understanding workplace processes. Organizational 
research has typically shied away from idiosyncratic constructs in favor of broader 
dimensions, yet these studies provide initial evidence that even unique personal memories 
can be characterized according to phenomenological and linguistic characteristics that 
relate to organizationally relevant outcomes. Furthermore, these studies demonstrate the 
importance of the temporally extended self in work processes. Not only should researchers 
be concerned with the individual in the present moment and the individual over time, but 
also with the individual embedded in time. By explicitly addressing the experiences that 
constitute individuals sense of self, we can begin to understand how the individual came to 
be the person they are now. 
4.4 Limitations 
 Of course, these studies are not without limitations. Most notable is the separation 
of the memory sharer and memory listener into two separate studies. This separation did 
allow for increased control over the memory sharing process for both individuals in the 
dyad, but it also led to an impoverished communication channel. During normal memory 
sharing, the sharer would be receiving feedback from the listener in the form of verbal and 
nonverbal cues. Furthermore, the listener would also be able to influence the direction of 
the memory sharing by asking questions, providing commentary, nodding along, etc. By 
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separating the memory sharer and listener, all this reciprocal information was lost. 
However, this separation did allow for increased precision in the memory sharing process. 
For example, shared memories were precisely chosen for the memory listener, potentially 
removing additional noise from the affective and informational outcomes that would occur 
if every listener heard a unique memory. Furthermore, this allowed for an experimental test 
of the role of memory immersion.  
 For Study 1 addressing the memory sharer, two severe limitations are the adapted 
memory manipulation and the psychometric issues associated with the MEQ. First, as 
addressed above, the adapted memory manipulation may be eliciting memories that are 
uniformly vivid, emotional, autonoetic, etc. While the linguistic analyses do not uniformly 
support this conclusion, future research should continue to explore adaptations to this 
manipulation to ascertain which attributes are most important for eliciting self-defining and 
everyday memories. Second, the MEQ suffers from severe ceiling effects, which may be 
obscuring meaningful differences in memory phenomenology for self-defining and 
everyday memories. Future work should adapt this scale to be more psychometrically 
sound for use associated with this memory manipulation or choose a scale better suited to 
addressing memory phenomenology.  
 For the second study, one limitation is the idiosyncratic nature of the selected 
vignettes. While these vignettes were real memories shared by real people, they did contain 
various idiosyncratic characteristics that may have influenced listener’s perceptions of the 
memory and subsequent use in informing affective and informational outcomes. 
Furthermore, the vignettes manipulated various linguistic characteristics at once under the 
umbrella of memory immersion. While this was done in an attempt to understand how 
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shared memories are interpreted and used at a broad level, future research could explore 
this problem with greater precision by manipulating a single linguistic variable at a time.  
 Additionally, the affect confound in the selected memory vignettes represents an 
additional limitation. The vignettes were selected for high/low immersion memories based 
on their affect words, with high immersion memories containing more affect words than 
low immersion memories. The high immersion memories are both memories containing 
more positive words than low immersion memories. While this had the effect of excluding 
a potential confound of negative emotion for the current study (e.g., positive high 
immersion self-defining memory and negative high immersion everyday memory, or vice 
versa), it does limit the generalizability of the results. A follow-up study should explore if 
these effects hold for self-defining memories that are negatively valenced in addition to 
self-defining memories that are positively valenced.   
4.5 Future Directions.  
 Even as the current studies suffer from several limitations, they also provide 
avenues for future research. These studies represent a first step in the understanding of self-
defining memory sharing at work. Future research can extend these findings in several 
interesting ways. First, researchers could continue to precisely manipulate memory 
characteristics and explore how they relate to memory sharing outcomes. As already 
discussed above, research is needed to determine if negative self-defining memories 
similarly influence affective and informational outcomes. In addition to this, researchers 
could construct vignettes that are identical except along one phenomenological dimension 
to test the effect of specific memory phenomenology on sharing outcomes in isolation. In 
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this study, memory immersion was tested broadly as a predictor of memory outcomes, but 
a great deal of research can be done breaking this immersion variable out into its specific 
facets.  
 As an alternative, researchers could also opt for less experimental control but more 
real-world generalizability and pursue studies using less impoverished communication 
channels. Instead of testing the memory sharer and memory listener in isolation, 
researchers could allow the memory sharing process to unfold between individuals as a 
natural conversation. This would allow for an exploration not only of how the memory 
sharer influences the memory listener, but of reciprocal communicative effects across the 
dyad.  
 Finally, self-defining memory research can extend beyond the memory sharing 
process. The self-defining memories an individual holds may inform many personally 
relevant variables. At the individual level, self-defining memories play an important role 
in establishing coherent and unified self-experience by informing the attitudes and beliefs 
an individual holds (Bauer & McAdams, 2004; Bauer et al., 2005; Bluck, Alea, Habermas, 
& Rubin, 2005; McAdams et al., 2001; Pillemer, 2001). Extending this to the workers, 
attitudes and beliefs are of direct interest to many organizations (e.g., job satisfaction, 
justice beliefs, etc.) and have important repercussions for subsequent behaviors (e.g., 
turnover intentions, compliance, adherence to rules, etc.). Furthermore, self-defining 
memories contain goal-relevant information that can inform present and future behavior 
(Bluck et al., 2005; Bluck & Glück, 2004; Pratt, Norris, Arnold, & Filyer, 1999). The 
recollection of these memories highlights instances of goal attainment/failure (Conway & 
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), and allows individuals to adjust their behavior in the present 
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accordingly. For example, self-defining memories can shed light on workers’ motivation 
for continued goal striving engagement, self-regulation, resiliency, long-term goals, values, 
and aspects of their decision-making.  
 More broadly, this research project is consistent with calls for a more first person, 
experiential emphasis within work psychology. Our memories, how they are reflected upon 
and communicated to others, and particularly those memories connected to who we think 
we are, are at the core of subjective, first person experience. Research on self-defining 
memories, more generally, can touch upon numerous domains within the 
Industrial/Organizational Psychology literature.  Specifically, self-defining memories and 
their associated autobiographical reasoning processes (Habermas & Bluck, 2000) may be 
informative for selection and performance processes. When faced with adversity, how 
individuals overcome that adversity and how they incorporate the event into their sense of 
self may have important implications workplace performance and selection. Individuals 
who incorporate adverse events into redemptive narratives where they were able to learn 
and grow past the adversity, for example, may be better suited for certain jobs than 
individuals who see adversity solely as an obstacle. Research using self-defining memories 
can begin to explicitly explore how autobiographical reasoning processes influence a 
variety of work outcomes.   
4.6  Conclusion 
 From the memory sharer to the memory listener, the sharing of self-defining and 
everyday memories provides an important mechanism for understanding the development 
of affective connections and conveyance of personal information at work. These memories 
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provide emotional records of past experience that are central to the individual’s sense of 
self. Sharing these memories with others allows for the communication of a small piece of 
the temporally extended self.  
 
APPENDIX A. SELF-DEFINING MEMORY TASK 
A.1 Adapted Self-Defining Memory Task (changes highlighted).  
This part of the experiment concerns the recall of a personal memory about work. A 
personal memory about work has the following attributes: 
 
1. It is a memory about an enduring theme, issue, or conflict from your life. It is a 
memory that helps explain who you are as an individual and might be the memory 
you would tell someone else if you wanted that person to understand you in a 
profound way.  
2. It is at least 1 year old.  
3. It is a memory that is either important or unimportant to you.  
4. It is a memory that can be positive or negative, or both, in how it makes you feel, 
or it could be a memory that evokes little or no emotion.  
5. It is memory that has been thought about many times or rarely.  
6. It is a memory about work. The memory does not need to have occurred at work, 
but it should be about work in some way. 
 
To understand best what a personal memory is, imagine you have just met someone you 
like very much and are going for a walk together. Each of you is very committed to 
helping the other get to know yourself. In the course of the conversation, you describe a 
work or professional memory that you feel conveys powerfully how you have come to be 
the worker/professional you currently are. It is precisely this memory, which you tell the 
other person, that constitutes a personal memory. 
 
Please describe your work-related memory. In your description, please include a caption 
for the event, your age at the time of the event, whom you were with, what happened, and 
how you and any others present responded to the event. Please include details that would 




A.2 Original Self-Defining Memory Task (changes highlighted) 
This part of the experiment concerns the recall of a special kind of personal memory 
called a self-defining memory. A self-defining memory has the following attributes: 
 
1. It is a memory about an important enduring theme, issue, or conflict from your 
life. It is a memory that helps explain who you are as an individual and might be 
the memory you would tell someone else if you wanted that person to understand 
you in a profound way. 
2. It is at least 1 year old. 
3. It is a memory from your life that you remembered very clearly and that still feels 
important to you even as you think about it. 
4. It may be a memory that can be positive or negative, or both, in how it makes you 
feel. The only important aspect is that it leads to strong feelings. 
5. It is a memory that you have thought about many times. It should be familiar to 
you like a picture you have studied or a song (happy or sad) you have learned by 
heart. 
6. It is a memory linked to other similar memories that share the same theme or 
concern. 
To understand best what a self-defining memory is, imagine you have just met someone 
you like very much and are going for a walk together. Each of you is very committed to 
helping the other get to know the “Real You”. You are not trying to play a role or to strike 
a pose. While, inevitably, we say things that present a picture of ourselves that might not 
be completely accurate, imagine that you are making every effort to be honest. In the course 
of the conversation, you describe a memory that you feel conveys powerfully how you 
have come to be the person you currently are. It is precisely this memory, which you tell 
the other person and simultaneously repeat to yourself, that constitutes a self-defining 
memory. 
 
Please describe your self-defining memory. In your description, please include a caption 
for the event, your age at the time of the event, whom you were with, what happened, and 
how you and any others present responded to the event. Please include details that would 
help an imagined friend see and feel as you did.  
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APPENDIX B.  EVERYDAY MEMORY TASK 
B.1 Adapted Everyday Memory Task (changes highlighted).  
This part of the experiment concerns the recall of a personal memory about work. A 
personal memory about work has the following attributes: 
 
1. It is a memory that was personally experienced, i.e., not a memory that a 
parent or sibling described to you, nor something that you read about or heard 
about through the media.  
2. It is at least 1 year old.  
3. It is a memory that is either important or unimportant to you.  
4. It is a memory that can be positive or negative, or both, in how it makes you 
feel, or it could be a memory that evokes little or no emotion.  
5. It is memory that has been thought about many times or rarely.  
6. It is a memory about work. The memory does not need to have occurred at 
work, but it should be about work in some way. 
 
To understand best what a personal memory is, imagine you have just met someone you 
like very much and are going for a walk together. Each of you is very committed to helping 
the other get to know yourself. In the course of the conversation, you describe a work or 
professional memory that you personally experienced. It is precisely this memory, which 
you tell the other person, that constitutes a personal memory. 
Please describe your work-related memory. In your description, please include a caption 
for the event, your age at the time of the event, whom you were with, what happened, and 
how you and any others present responded to the event. Please include details that would 
help an imagined friend see and feel as you did.  
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B.2 Original Everyday Memory Task (changes highlighted). 
This part of the experiment concerns the recall of an autobiographical memory. An 
autobiographical memory has the following attributes: 
 
1. It is a memory that was personally experienced, i.e., not a memory that a parent 
or sibling described to you, nor something that you read about or heard about 
through the media.  
2. It is at least 1 year old. 
3. It is a memory that is either important or unimportant to you.  
4. It is a memory that can be positive or negative in how it makes you feel, or it 
could be a memory that evokes little or no emotion.  
5. It is a memory that has been thought about many times or rarely 
 
Please describe your autobiographical memory. In your description, please include a 
caption for the event, your age at the time of the event, whom you were with, what 
happened, and how you and any others present responded to the event. Please include 
details that would help an imagined friend see and feel as you did.  
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APPENDIX C. STUDY 1 MEASUREMENTS 
C.1 Manipulation check items 
Stem: Please answer the following questions regarding the memory you just described. (1 
- Strongly disagree, 2 - Somewhat disagree, 3 - Neither agree nor disagree, 4 - Somewhat 
agree, 5 - Strongly agree) 
1. This memory is an important memory for me. 
2. This memory represents the "real" me. 
3. I think about this memory regularly. 
4. This memory describes an important theme from my life. 
5. This is an emotional memory about my life. 
6. To what extent does this memory reflect who you are as a person? (1 - Not at all, 
2 - A little, 3 - A moderate amount, 4 - A lot, 5 - A great deal) 
 
C.2 Memory Experiences Questionnaire (Sutin & Robins, 2007) 
Stem: Please answer the following questions regarding the memory you just described. (1 
- Strongly disagree, 2 - Somewhat disagree, 3 - Neither agree nor disagree, 4 - Somewhat 
agree, 5 - Strongly agree).  
1. Memory Vividness 
1. My memory for this event is clear. 
2. My memory for this event is very vivid. 
3. My memory for this event is very detailed. 
4. My memory for this event is dim. 
5. My memory for this event is very vague. 
6. My memory for this event is sketchy. 
2. Coherence 
1. The order of events in the memory is clear. 
2. When I recall this memory, the sequence of events seems realistic. 
3. This memory is of an event that occurred once at a particular time and 
place, not a summary or merging of many similar or related events. 
4. I recognize the setting in which my memory takes place. 
5. The order of events in the memory is confusing. 
6. This memory comes back to me in bits and pieces, not as a logical, 
coherent story. 
7. This memory is a blending of many similar, related events rather than a 
specific memory about a particular event. 
8. I have a difficult time remembering the event in a coherent manner. 
3. Accessibility 
1. This memory just sprang to my mind when I read the instructions. 
 142
2. This memory was easy for me to recall. 
3. It was difficult for me to think of this memory. 
4. I had to think for a while before I could recall this event. 
5. I really had to search my “memory bank” for this experience. 
4. Sensory detail 
1. As I remember the event, I can hear it in my mind. 
2. As I remember the event, I can feel now the emotions that I felt then. 
3. I can bodily “feel” myself in this memory. 
4. When I recall this event, I think the same things I thought when the event 
originally happened. 
5. When I recall this memory, I do not feel the same feelings I felt when the 
event originally happened. 
6. When I recall this event, it does not really feel like I am reliving the 
experience. 
7. My memory for this event does not involve a lot of sensory information 
(sounds, smells, tastes, etc.). 
8. As I remember the event, I have a difficult time recalling the particular 
physical reactions and sensations I had during the experience. 
5. Emotional intensity 
1. As I am remembering the experience now, my feelings are very intense. 
2. My emotions are very intense concerning this event. 
3. The memory of this event evokes powerful emotions. 
4. I do not remember having particularly strong emotions at the time of this 
event. 
5. I do not have strong emotions about this memory. 
6. This memory does not evoke strong emotions in me. 
6. Visual perspective 
1. I see the experience in the memory through my own eyes. 
2. In my memory, I see this experience through my own eyes. 
3. When I visualize this memory, I clearly see this event from my own 
perspective. 
4. I view this memory as if I was an observer to the experience. 
5. In my memory, I see this experience through the eyes of others. 
6. As I remember this event, I feel like an observer watching myself. 
7. Time perspective 
1. My memory for the year when the event took place is clear. 
2. My memory for the day when the event took place is clear. 
3. My memory for the hour when the event took place is clear. 
4. My memory for the year when the event took place is vague. 
5. My memory for the day when the event took place is vague. 
6. My memory for the hour when the event took place is vague. 
8. Sharing 
1. I often share this memory with friends or family. 
2. Since it happened, I have talked about this event many times. 
3. I frequently think about or talk about this event with others. 
4. I rarely tell others about this memory. 
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5. I do not feel the need to share this memory with others. 
6. I do not think about this memory often. 
9. Distancing 
1. I don't have much in common with the person in the memory. 
2. I feel like the person in this memory is a different person than who I am 
today. 
3. When I recall this memory, I think, “that's not me anymore.” 
4. My behavior in this memory is consistent with my personality. 
5. I feel like I am the same person in the memory as I am today. 
6. This memory is consistent with who I think I am today. 
10. Valence 
1. The overall tone of the memory is positive. 
2. The experience described in this memory is positive. 
3. My feelings at the time were positive. 
4. The overall tone of the memory is negative. 
5. The experience described in this memory is negative. 
6. My feelings at the time were negative. 
 
C.3 Centrality of Events Scale (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006a) 
Stem: Please answer the following questions regarding the memory you just described. (1 
- Strongly disagree, 2 – Disagree, 3 - Somewhat disagree, 4 - Neither agree nor disagree, 5 
- Somewhat agree, 6 – Agree, 7 - Strongly agree) 
1. This event has become a reference point for the way I understand new 
experiences. 
2. I automatically see connections and similarities between this event and 
experiences in my present life. 
3. I feel that this event has become part of my identity. 
4. This event can be seen as a symbol or mark of important themes in my life. 
5. This event is making my life different from the life of most other people. 
6. This event has become a reference point for the way I understand myself and the 
world. 
7. I believe that people who haven’t experienced this type of event think differently 
than I do. 
8. This event tells a lot about who I am. 
9. I often see connections and similarities between this event and my current 
relationships with other people. 
10. I feel that this event has become a central part of my life story. 
11. I believe that people who haven’t experienced this type of event, have a different 
way of looking upon themselves than I have. 
12. This event has colored the way I think and feel about other experiences. 
13. This event has become a reference point for the way I look upon my future. 
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14. If I were to weave a carpet of my life, this event would be in the middle with 
threads going out to many other experiences. 
15. My life story can be divided into two main chapters: one is before and one is after 
this event happened. 
16. This event permanently changed my life. 
17. I often think about the effects this event will have on my future. 
18. This event was a turning point in my life. 
19. If this event had not happened to me, I would be a different person today. 




APPENDIX D. STUDY 2 MEMORY MANIPULATIONS 
D.1 Self-defining memory – High immersion 
I was 28 at the time. I worked about 60 hours a week as a teacher making sure that 
everything my students needed would be available to them to ensure that they were getting 
the education that they deserve. But, I was burnt out. While I made sure not to express my 
frustrations at work, when I was at home I was depressed and I was distant towards my 
family members constantly wondering if I was doing a good job. They were understanding 
and I am grateful to them because of this. But, at work I didn't feel appreciated. I worked 
hard, did what was asked of me, but I didn't feel appreciated. Sure, my students were 
wonderful, we got along well and rarely did I have problems with them. But, I felt that my 
work was ignored. Still, I kept it to myself and continued to do the work that was expected 
of me. I didn't want my students’ work to falter because I was feeling this way.  
Then one day during an awards ceremony at the end of the school year, my supervisor with 
my boss standing beside her started giving their final speech towards the children. But, all 
of a sudden, it shifted towards the teachers. They started thanking us for our hard work. 
They even apologized to us for making it seem like they didn't care. Just like we were busy 
they were -they didn't say it but it was enough to understand this. They took a few moments 
to say a small speech about each and every one of the teachers. Explain their strong points 
and why they were so cherished. But, what they did after brought me to tears so that I 
couldn't even get up from my seat and accept the award and tickets for an all-expense paid 
cruise vacation for me and my family. I still remember when the principal walked up to me 
and hugged me, telling me that I do good work and to never doubt myself. That even if she 
can't say it all the time she does appreciate what I do.  
It was at that moment I felt refreshed and ready to take on a new year. I knew what I was 
capable of and I was completely sure that the work that I did was good and beneficial to 
my students and it was impacting them in a positive way. I honestly wasn't expecting any 
of this. There are moments when I doubt myself. I guess I just needed to hear “good work” 
every once in a while. But, my boss went the extra mile. It was one of the best vacations I 
had in a long time and it was the first time in 3 years working with my school where I was 
very eager to get to work and continue to show them that I am capable of doing a good job 
all year round. I guess I should have realized it at the time. That if my students are happy 
and I was working in a good environment with little trouble to the point where my bosses 
had little interaction with me, then it meant that I was doing a good enough job that I didn't 
need constant supervision. 
D.2 Self-defining memory – Low immersion 
I'm a dog walker and about a year and a half ago I experienced for the first time working 
with a dog that I could not handle. I was 21 at the time. I had been asked to start walking a 
dog 5 days a week. I was immediately uncomfortable upon meeting this dog because he 
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was extremely large and aggressive. I told myself that things would get better. As the days 
went on, things got worse.  
When I went to walk him, he would growl and bark at me and not let me get close. Luckily, 
his owners were home sometimes and they would put his collars and leash on for me. I 
began to dread going over there every day and my heart rate would be very high during the 
entire half hour. This dog was about 150 pounds and had never been trained. He wore a 
shock collar and I was supposed to carry a remote to shock him when he did bad things. 
This felt really cruel to me so I didn't want to do it. He had so many triggers that our walks 
were total nightmares every day. He hated other dogs and he hated people. They lived 
across the street from a large park that was unfenced. People would let their dogs off leash 
and there would be no control if their dogs decided to run up to us. I would have no choice 
except to grab the dog and run away as quickly as possible. Sometimes people would try 
to approach us and ask to pet the dog, and I had to tell them no because I knew the dog 
would just attack them.  
One time a man kept following us closely even though I was clearly trying to get away and 
the dog was getting more agitated the closer he got. I had to take him in and out on the 
elevators and around tight hallways, and it always gave me a lot of anxiety not knowing if 
a person and another dog could pop out at any moment.  
One day, I went over and the owners were not home. They left me treats to give the dog 
because they thought that would help. The dog was so angry with me that he didn't care 
about the treats. He ended up sitting in front of the door so that I couldn't even leave. I left 
a note for the owners telling them that I was unable to take him on a walk that day since I 
couldn't even approach him. After he left the door alone, I was able to run out quickly. I 
told my boss that day that I just could not walk him anymore, and she told me that I never 
had to go back there.  
I've never been scared of dogs. I love bigger dogs and I hate the discrimination that some 
breeds face. I felt like it was partially my fault. My boss got a different girl to take over for 
me and I always wonder what ever happened, if she still walks him or if the same thing 
happened to her.  
D.3 Everyday memory – High immersion 
This was my first teaching experience. It was in the Fall of 2016 and I had to teach integral 
calculus. I had taught, before but it was always 2-3 students at a time. I had no experience 
of classroom teaching. So, I was more than a little worried. My university had a pretty 
extensive TA training program which ran for an entire week. I attended all the workshops 
religiously, took notes, read and reread the TA manual. Still I found myself ill-prepared. 
With hindsight, my lack of confidence was pretty natural but at that point I was super-
scared to face my students.  
Anyway, the appointed hour came and I had no choice but to go on. I introduced myself, 
asked each one of them to do a brief introduction and got down to business. Fortunately, it 
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was a worksheet session and so I didn’t have to do much. The students were well prepared 
- most of them had done AP calculus. The first day was a success.  
As the quarter went by I found the work more and more easygoing. All I had to do was go 
to the class and do a bunch of integrals on the board. So, I was lax and stopped preparing 
the homework problems beforehand. After all, I don’t need to prepare for freshman 
integration problems. How wrong I was!  
One day we were doing surfaces of revolution. I used to do them in a different way than it 
was taught in the text. The textbook is very formal - they set up the problem nicely and 
then solve it by following a specific algorithm. I tried to do the first problem but it wasn’t 
very easy and I had to step back and think for five minutes before the solution came to me. 
To the credit of my students, no one showed any signs of impatience in the meantime.  
I was halfway through writing and explaining my solution when someone politely asked 
for a clarification. Then it hit me - they are not following anything because I was doing this 
problem in a completely different method. I tried to make them understand but it was 
hopeless. What I was doing didn’t have any relation with the stuff they have seen in the 
professor’s lecture or in the text. So, I asked them just to copy it down for now and 
promised to come up with a better solution next time. I was feeling doubly uncomfortable 
because it was a day of observation by the TA mentor.  
Other than that, I didn’t have much trouble with my class. It was a refuge for me - whenever 
I was stuck with differential geometry or algebra, I would think about the class I was 
teaching. It was very comforting to know that there is at least one class which I could ace. 
I learned a lot about teaching after this course. In my view, teaching is like a performing 
art. No amount of reading or attending workshops will prepare you for the challenge. You 
only get better with practice. 
D.4 Everyday memory – Low immersion 
Our company had just moved offices during the previous summer. Before moving to our 
current place in the woodsy suburbs, not far from the mall, we were in the city limits. I 
preferred our old location because it was much closer to my apartment, making it a shorter 
commute on city streets and not the expressway, and also I liked how there were lots of 
good lunch places nearby. But it was a larger and newer office, and I often saw wildlife out 
the window when I was making copies.  
It was December, and we'd only had snow a couple of times so far that winter. I was coping 
with the drive but still not liking it. This particular day, a Monday, a freezing mixture had 
fallen the night before. I scraped my windows and set out carefully on the roads. They were 
a little tricky but I knew I had to make it in to work. The office manager was on vacation 
the first part of this week, the week before Christmas, and I would have a lot of her work 
to do in addition to my own.  
I noticed when I got closer to work there was a traffic signal out, then another one. I pulled 
into the driveway and to the back of the building and my regular spot. No one had shoveled 
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or salted the sidewalk, which was odd, but I shrugged it off as we had a newer coworker 
doing that and perhaps he thought he should wait until asked by one of the bosses to do it. 
I walked in the door and noticed no lights were on. The door had been unlocked, so 
someone must already be there.  
I called out “hello.” One of the bosses, Bob, responded that he was down the hall. There 
was Bob, standing with Danny, the new estimator. Bob said that the power was out from 
the ice storm and he had been texting everyone.  
I checked my phone and yep, there it was, sent after I had already started out from home. I 
asked Bob what we should do. When the power went out at the old place, we sometimes 
went out for breakfast then came back and it was usually back on.  
Danny sad that the phone didn’t work and Bob said that it could be a couple of days without 
power. Lots of people were out in the area, and since we’re not around many other 
businesses, our section priority was low. Bob said that he was sending everyone home and 
would call when the power was back on.  
I was simultaneously very happy to have some time off, because I'd not even started my 
Christmas shopping, and distressed, because when the power did come back I would have 
even more work to do. With nothing to be done about it, I said my goodbyes and went out 
the door and back into my car. I went right to the mall, which had power. It was a weird 
feeling to have my day suddenly so different than I had expected it to unfold.  
The power ended up being out all week, finally coming back on that Friday evening, the 
day before Christmas Eve. Plus they even paid us for the week, so we all ended up with a 
nice bit of time off for the holidays. 
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APPENDIX E.  STUDY 2 MEASUREMENTS 
E.1 Manipulation check items 
Please answer the following questions about the person whose memory you just read. (1 - 
Strongly agree, 2 - Somewhat agree, 3 - Neither agree nor disagree, 4 - Somewhat disagree, 
5 - Strongly disagree) 
1. The shared memory is an important memory for this person. 
2. The shared memory represents the "real me" for this person. 
3. This person thinks about the shared memory regularly. 
4. The shared memory describes an important theme from this person's life. 
5. The shared memory is an emotional memory about this person's life. 
6. To what extent does the shared memory reflect who this person is? (1 – Not at all, 
2 – A little, 3 – A moderate amount, 4 – A lot, 5 – A great deal) 
 
E.2 Likability  
Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements regarding the 
imagined person whose memory you just read. (1 - Strongly disagree, 2 – Disagree, 3 - 
Neither agree nor disagree, 4 – Agree, 5 - Strongly agree) 
1. This person is friendly. 
2. This person is likeable. 
3. This person is warm. 
4. This person is approachable. 
5. I would ask this person for advice. 
6. I would like this person as a coworker. 
7. I would like to be friends with this person. 
8. This person is knowledgeable. 
 
E.3 Affective trust (adapted; McAllister, 1995) 
The following questions are about the person whose memory you just read. Please imagine 
this person is a coworker who has shared this memory with you. Based on this memory, 
please indicate the extent to which you agree to the following statements regarding this 
imagined person. (1 - Strongly disagree, 2 – Disagree, 3 - Neither agree nor disagree, 4 – 
Agree, 5 - Strongly agree) 
1. I believe we would have a sharing relationship. We would both freely share our 
ideas, feelings, and hopes. 
2. I believe I would be able to talk freely to this individual about difficulties I am 
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having at work and know that (s)he will want to listen. 
3. I believe I would feel a sense of loss if one of us was transferred and we could no 
longer work together. 
4. I believe that if I shared my problems with this person, (s)he would respond 
constructively and caringly. 




Please indicate the extent to which the following adjectives describe how you feel about 
the imagined person whose memory you just read. (1 - Not at all, 2 – Slightly, 3 – 







E.5 Meaningfulness (adapted; Bunderson & Thompson, 2009, May et al., 2004) 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements regarding the 
imagined person whose memory you just read. (1 - Strongly disagree, 2 – Disagree, 3 - 
Neither agree nor disagree, 4 – Agree, 5 - Strongly agree) 
1. This person's job activities are personally meaningful to him/her. 
2. The work this person does on their job is worthwhile. 
3. This person's job activities are significant to him/her. 
4. The work this person does on their job is meaningful to him/her. 
5. I feel that the work this person does on their job is valuable. 
6. The work that this person does is important. 
7. This person has a meaningful job. 
8. The work that this person does makes the world a better place. 
9. What this person does at work makes a difference in the world. 
10. The work that this person does is meaningful. 
 
E.6 Insight  
Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements regarding the 
imagined person whose memory you just read. (1 - Strongly disagree, 2 – Disagree, 3 - 
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Neither agree nor disagree, 4 – Agree, 5 - Strongly agree) 
1. This person is an insightful person. 
2. This person knows "life lessons" that can apply to life broadly. 
3. This person can articulate the way he/she thinks about the world. 
4. This person has wisdom that can apply to many contexts. 
5. The knowledge this person has is not relevant to my life. 
6. There is little I can learn from this person about the world generally. 
 
E.7 Cognitive trust 
The following questions are about the person whose memory you just read. Please imagine 
this person is a coworker who has shared this memory with you. Based on this memory, 
please indicate the extent to which you agree to the following statements regarding this 
imagined person. (1 - Strongly disagree, 2 – Disagree, 3 - Neither agree nor disagree, 4 – 
Agree, 5 - Strongly agree) 
1. I believe this person approaches his/her job with professionalism and dedication. 
2. Given this person's track record, I see no reason to doubt his/her competence and 
preparation for the job. 
3. I believe I can rely on this person not to make my job more difficult by careless 
work. 
4. I believe that most people, even those who aren't close friends of this individual, 
trust and respect him/her as a coworker. 
5. I believe that other work associates who must interact with this individual 
consider him/her to be trustworthy. 
6. I believe that if people knew more about this individual and his/her background, 
they would be more concerned and monitor his/her performance more closely. 
 
E.8 Memory Experiences Questionnaire (adapted; Sutin & Robins, 2007) 
The following questions are about the person whose memory you just read. Please think 
about how this person considers the memory they just shared. Please indicate the extent to 
which you agree to the following statements regarding this imagined person. (1 - Strongly 
disagree, 2 – Disagree, 3 - Neither agree nor disagree, 4 – Agree, 5 - Strongly agree) 
1. Vividness 
1. This person's memory for this event is clear. 
2. This person's memory for this event is very vivid. 
3. This person's memory for this event is very detailed. 
4. This person's memory for this event is dim. 
5. This person's memory for this event is very vague. 
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6. This person's memory for this event is sketchy. 
2. Coherence 
1. The order of events in the memory is clear. 
2. When this person recalls this memory, the sequence of events seems 
realistic. 
3. This memory is of an event that occurred once at a particular time and 
place, not a summary or merging of many similar or related events. 
4. This person recognizes the setting in which my memory takes place. 
5. The order of events in the memory is confusing. 
6. This memory comes back to this person in bits and pieces, not as a logical, 
coherent story. 
7. This memory is a blending of many similar, related events rather than a 
specific memory about a particular event. 
8. This person has a difficult time remembering the event in a coherent 
manner. 
3. Accessibility 
1. This memory just sprang to this person's mind when thinking about their 
past. 
2. This memory was easy for this person to recall. 
3. It was difficult for this person to think of this memory. 
4. This person had to think for a while before they could recall this event. 
5. This person really had to search their "memory bank" for this experience. 
4. Sensory detail 
1. As this person remembers the event, they can hear it in their mind. 
2. As this person remembers the event, they can feel now the emotions that 
they felt then. 
3. This person can bodily "feel" themselves in this memory. 
4. When this person recalls this event, they think the same things they 
thought when the event originally happened. 
5. When this person recalls this memory, they do not feel the same feelings 
they felt when the event originally happened. 
6. When this person recalls this event, it does not really feel like they are 
reliving the experience. 
7. This person's memory for this event does not involve a lot of sensory 
information (sounds, smells, tastes, etc.). 
8. As this person remembers the event, they have a difficult time recalling 
the particular physical reactions and sensations they had during the 
experience. 
5. Emotional intensity 
1. As this person is remembering the experience, their feelings are very 
intense. 
2. This person's emotions are very intense concerning this event. 
3. The memory of this event evokes powerful emotions for this person. 
4. This person does not remember having particularly strong emotions at the 
time of this event. 
5. This person does not have strong emotions about this memory. 
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6. This memory does not evoke strong emotions in this person. 
6. Visual 
1. This person sees the experience in the memory through their own eyes. 
2. In their memory, this person sees this experience through their own eyes. 
3. When this person visualizes this memory, they clearly see this event from 
their own perspective. 
4. This person views this memory as if they were an observer to the 
experience. 
5. In their memory, this person sees this experience through the eyes of 
others.  
6. As this person remembers this event, they feel like an observer watching 
themselves. 
7. Time perspective 
1. This person's memory for the year when the event took place is clear. 
2. This person's memory for the day when the event took place is clear. 
3. This person's memory for the hour when the event took place is clear. 
4. This person's memory for the year when the event took place is vague. 
5. This person's memory for the day when the event took place is vague. 
6. This person's memory for the hour when the event took place is vague. 
8. Sharing 
1. This person often shares this memory with friends or family. 
2. Since it happened, this person has talked about this event many times. 
3. This person frequently thinks about or talks about this event with others. 
4. This person rarely tell others about this memory. 
5. This person does not feel the need to share this memory with others. 
6. This person does not think about this memory often. 
9. Distancing 
1. The person sharing the memory doesn't have much in common with the 
person in the memory. 
2. The person sharing the memory feels like the person in this memory is a 
different person than who they are today. 
3. When this person recalls this memory, they think, "that's not me 
anymore." 
4. This person's behavior in this memory is consistent with their personality. 
5. This person feels like they are the same person in the memory as they are 
today. 
6. This memory is consistent with who this person thinks they are today. 
10. Valence 
1. The overall tone of the memory is positive. 
2. The experience described in this memory is positive. 
3. This person's feelings at the time were positive. 
4. The overall tone of the memory is negative. 
5. The experience described in this memory is negative. 
6. This person's feelings at the time were negative. 
 
E.9 Centrality of Events Scale (adapted; Berntsen & Rubin, 2006a) 
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The following questions are about the person whose memory you just read. Please think 
about how this person considers the memory they just shared. Please indicate the extent to 
which you agree to the following statements regarding this imagined person. (1 - Strongly 
disagree, 2 – Disagree, 3 - Neither agree nor disagree, 4 – Agree, 5 - Strongly agree) 
1. This event has become a reference point for the way this person understands new 
experiences. 
2. This person automatically sees connections and similarities between this event 
and experiences in their present life. 
3. This person feels that this event has become part of their identity. 
4. This event can be seen as a symbol or mark of important themes in this person's 
life. 
5. This event is making this person's life different from the life of most other people. 
6. This event has become a reference point for the way this person understands 
themselves and the world. 
7. I believe that people who haven't experienced this type of event think differently 
than this person does. 
8. This event tells a lot about who this person is. 
9. This person often sees connections and similarities between this event and their 
current relationships with other people. 
10. This person feels that this event has become a central part of their life story. 
11. This person believes that people who haven't experienced this type of event, have 
a different way of looking upon themselves than they have. 
12. This event has colored the way this person thinks and feels about other 
experiences. 
13. This event has become a reference point for the way this person looks upon their 
future. 
14. If this person were to weave a carpet of their life, this event would be in the 
middle with threads going out to many other experiences. 
15. This person's life story can be divided into two main chapters: one is before and 
one is after this event happened. 
16. This event permanently changed this person's life. 
17. This person often thinks about the effects this event will have on their future. 
18. This event was a turning point in this person's life. 
19. If this event had not happened to this person, they would be a different person 
today. 
20. When this person reflects upon their future, they often think back to this event. 
 
E.10 Likelihood of sharing a memory 
Please answer the following questions about the person whose memory you just read. (1 – 
Extremely unlikely, 2 – Somewhat unlikely, 3 – Neither likely nor unlikely, 4 – Somewhat 
likely, 5 – Extremely likely) 
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1. How likely are you to share something personal with this person? 
2. How likely are you to share an emotional story about yourself with this 
person? 
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